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Intention, Torture, and the Concept of State
Crime
Aditi Bagchi*
Notwithstanding the universal prohibition against torture, and
almost universal agreement that in order to qualify as torture, the act in
question must be committed intentionally with an illicit purpose, the
intentional element of torture remains ambiguous.  I make the following
claims about how we should interpret the intent requirement as applied
to states.  First, state intent should be understood objectively with
reference to the apparent reasons for state action.  The subjective
motivation of particular state actors is not directly relevant.  While we
focus on subjective intent in the context of individual crime because of its
relation to culpability and blameworthiness, in the context of state crime
we should be concerned with preserving the legitimacy of political
authority, and the conditions for legitimacy turn on the apparent reasons
rather than subjective motivations behind state action.  Second, the
primacy of questions of legitimacy also makes irrelevant the distinction
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. J.D. Yale
Law School; M.Sc. Oxford University; A.B. Harvard College. Thanks to Bill Burke-
White, George Fletcher, Seth Kreimer, Georg Reitboeck, participants in a faculty
workshop at Hofstra Law School and participants in a session of the 2007 Joint Annual
Meeting of the Law and Society Association for helpful comments and discussion at
various stages in my thinking and writing.
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between specific and general intent.  Instead, state-directed torture that
is committed secretly and in a manner that removes it from public
scrutiny should be regarded as quasi-criminal.  Finally, the official
interpretation of the Convention against Torture (CAT) adopted by the
United States is flawed because it imposes a specific intent requirement
that is not objective, and accords ambiguous weight to publicity.  In
doing so we make a double error: We treat state crimes as essentially
the same as individual crime, and we fail to distinguish between the
quasi-criminal and humanitarian functions of the CAT.  To identify a
state act as torture, courts should ask whether alleged acts (which
otherwise meet the actus reus of torture) appear to have been motivated
by radical indifference to the suffering of the torture victim and the aim
of stripping her and/or other members of the political community of their
humanity.  Only to the extent they seek to further establish the acts as
“quasi-criminal,” courts should ask whether the alleged acts were
committed secretly or in a manner calculated to avoid accountability.
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Torture is wrong; it is also criminal.  We might expect the contours
of torture as a moral wrong to be vague.  Torture is wrong for many
reasons, and those reasons will operate with varying force against
distinct practices.  The absence of clarity in the law of torture is more
surprising.  Recent events in Iraq and in the “war on terror” have
demonstrated that this vagueness is dangerous, inasmuch as it renders the
legal concept vulnerable to manipulation and evasion.
Most common methods of torture are recognizable as such by the
international legal community.  But this international consensus is not
accompanied by similar certainty with respect to the legal standard.
Among the open questions on legal torture are: which physical acts
amount to torture, whose acts count as torture, how much pain must an
act produce before it is torture, and in what sense must the act and the
pain be intentional.  In this paper, I focus on this last ambiguity.  I do not
expect to answer all outstanding questions.  My aim is to resist a move
that many commentators and courts make, namely, the recourse to
domestic criminal law as a means by which to understand the obligation
of states not to engage in torture.1  Because the intent of a state that has a
policy of torture is of fundamentally different import than the intent of an
individual who commits a crime like torture, we should understand the
doctrine of torture as applied to states to require a distinct mental state.
The Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) was enacted in December
1984, and went into effect in June 1987.2  To date, over 150 nations have
signed the treaty, which requires states to prosecute and prevent torture.3
The CAT defines torture as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity.4
1. See, e.g., In re J-E, 23 I&N Dec. 291 (BIA 2002), discussed infra in Part I.B.2.
2. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46 (June 26, 1987) [hereinafter “CAT”].
3. See id. at art. 2, 4-7. For an updated list of those states which have ratified,
together with their reservations, see United Nations Treaty Collection, Part IV (Human
Rights), Section 9 (Convention Against Torture) at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en.
4. Id. at art. 1.
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The statute defines torture without specifying the nature of the torturer;
that is, it does not limit the legal attribution of torture to natural persons.
Clearly, individuals may commit torture on behalf of states, but states too
might engage in torture by adopting torture as a state policy or by
systematically employing it as a means of governance.
There have been few efforts to articulate with greater specificity the
mental state required in order for a state to commit torture.  The rule is
incomplete both in international law and in domestic law implementing
the Convention.  In the international context, the standard adopted by the
CAT has never been fleshed out because those who have drafted
jurisdictional statutes for international courts have shied away from state
crime altogether.5  The absence of either a robust practice of state
criminal responsibility or institutions capable of effectively imposing
criminal liability on states has thwarted the extension of the international
criminal law framework to state actors.  The language of criminality also
may not lend itself to state action inasmuch as it implies by analogy with
domestic law that a state that commits an international crime must
assume “outlaw status” and submit to a general forfeiture of rights, such
as those associated with sovereignty.6  It remains unclear what specific
legal consequences might flow from state crime that would not
ultimately burden the state’s population, who themselves may have been
the primary victims of the crime in question.  Thus, it is uncertain
whether there is or should be a legal concept of state crime.
My argument rejects the analogy with domestic criminal law and,
therefore, the view that we must identify and delineate the elements of
what would be state crime by analogy to the function and form of
domestic criminal law.  However, I assume the prevailing view that a
state is subject to constraints beyond those which it has assumed by
treaty and that those constraints should be recognized in law, namely in
jus cogens, which does not require consent by a state to bind it.7
5. See infra at Part I.
6. See Ted Stein, Observations on ‘Crimes of States,’ in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF
STATES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ILC’S DRAFT ARTICLE 19 ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY 196 (J.H.H. Weiler, M. Spinedi, and A. Cassesse eds., 1989). However,
the term is not misleading to the extent it implies only forfeiture of some rights associated
with sovereignty; after all, criminal conviction does not result in the forfeiture of all
rights in domestic law either. For example, it is not implausible that a developed regime
of international law would authorize nonconsensual intervention by third party states
within a “criminal” state.
7. At least two landmark cases have recognized the prohibition against torture as a
general rule of international law applicable to all states, or its jus cogens nature. See
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), and R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan
Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) UKHL [1999] 1 A.C. 147
(U.K.). But see Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, [2006]
2009] INTENTION, TORTURE AND THE CONCEPT OF STATE CRIME 5
Whether any violations of those fundamental obligations amount to
“state crime” will remain hotly disputed, and it is not my aim to defend
the concept as such.8  But, at the very least, states may commit “wrongful
acts” which do not depend on the violation of a treaty and in which states
not directly affected—indeed, the international community as a whole—
may have a cognizable interest.  Some of those wrongful acts are
categorically and unconditionally wrong in a way that less fundamental
wrongs are not.  Moreover, it is worth recognizing these acts in law as
state actions and not just individual acts.  Otherwise, our legal
characterization of such events will inadequately reflect their multiple
and overlapping moral meanings.  Thus, I will generally refer to
violations of fundamental, non-negotiable obligations to which all states
are subject and in which all states are interested as “state crimes” and
“quasi-criminal,” though I reject the view that these special reaches of
state obligation are analogous to criminal acts within a domestic political
community.  Without stepping into the ongoing debate in international
law as to whether acts commonly regarded as “state crimes” are
technically “crimes,” I observe that, in part because the question is
unresolved, the mental element of those would-be crimes has yet to be
properly conceptualized.
The mental state requirement is inadequately conceived in domestic
law as well.  In domestic courts, torture claims against states have been
litigated primarily in two contexts: (1) tort claims against foreign
sovereigns under the Alien Tort Claims Act9 and Torture Victim
Protection Act,10 and (2) withholding of removal claims under the
CAT.11  Political constraints and the availability of conveniently narrow
doctrinal analysis have thwarted development of a coherent intention
requirement in these contexts.  The executive branch’s singular attempt
UKHL 26 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (unanimously rejecting universal jurisdiction
for torture).
8. It is likely that, even if the notion of state crime is helpful, not all breaches of
state responsibility cognizable under jus cogens should be characterized as criminal or
quasi-criminal. See NINA JORGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 91 (2000) (“It may be that the degree of overlap has been
exaggerated because the scope of neither concept has been fully delimited.”).
One might also use the conception of obligations erga omnes to clarify the status
and character of international crime. But again, state crimes will not encompass the full
range of the obligations. See Giorgio Gaja, Obligations Erga Omnes, International
Crimes and Jus Cogens: A Tentative Analysis of Three Related Concepts, in Weiler et al.,
supra note 6, at 157-59.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
10. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
11. Immigration Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4) (2008).
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to define torture with specificity has not shed light but instead cast a
shadow on domestic discourse.12
In this article, I begin to remedy this gap.  Mens rea is traditionally
an essential prerequisite to criminal liability. In the context of state
crime, we must reconceptualize this intentionality requirement, which is
well-developed in domestic criminal law but oriented primarily toward
individuals.  State crimes are fundamentally unlike individual crimes,
and the related intent requirements should be construed differently. In the
context of individual crime, we seek to justify punishment with reference
to the blameworthiness of those who have committed the crimes we
punish; by contrast, in the context of state crime, we are concerned
primarily not with justifying punishment but with preserving the
legitimacy of political authority. Accordingly, while domestic criminal
law looks to the subjective intent of a defendant in order to assess
culpability, the law of state crime should look to objective intent to
assess whether the apparent reasons for state action are consistent with
legitimate political authority.  Secret torture that rejects discursive
scrutiny most flagrantly violates international norms and poses the
greatest danger to domestic and international legal order.
I make the following claims about how we should interpret the
universal but still ambiguous requirement that torture be committed with
the intention to accomplish the act.  First, intention by states should be
understood objectively.  The subjective motivation of particular state
actors is not directly relevant.  Second, the distinction between specific
and general intent is irrelevant to understanding torture by states.
Instead, torture that is committed secretly and in a manner that removes
it from public scrutiny should be regarded as quasi-criminal.  Finally, the
official interpretation of the CAT adopted by the United States is flawed
because it imposes a specific intent requirement that is not objective, and
accords ambiguous weight to publicity.13  In doing so we make a double
error: we treat state crimes as essentially the same as individual crime,
and we fail to distinguish between the quasi-criminal and humanitarian
functions of the CAT.  To identify a state act as torture, courts should ask
whether alleged acts, which otherwise meet the actus reus of torture,
appear to have been predicated on radical indifference to the suffering of
the torture victim and whether those acts strip her and/or other members
of the political community of their humanity.  Only to the extent that
12. See, e.g., John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, Department of Justice, Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General
Counsel, Department of Defense, Jan. 9, 2002; Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President, Aug. 1, 2002.
13. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5) (1999), discussed infra in Part V.
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they further seek to establish the acts as “quasi-criminal” should courts
ask whether the alleged acts were committed secretly or in a manner
calculated to avoid accountability.
My argument proceeds as follows.  In Part I, I provide background
as to how torture has been conceived in the international community and
in domestic law.  I then identify the philosophical gap I am trying to fill.
In Part II, the heart of my argument, I support my first claim that only
objective intent by states is morally relevant.  In Part III, I elaborate the
intuitive: state intent to torture is objectionable because ruthlessness and
cruelty, both incompatible with legitimate political authority, are
imminent in the practice.  In Part IV, I argue that this ultimately makes
the specific versus general intent distinction uninteresting with respect to
states and we should instead focus on the degree of transparency
surrounding a state policy of torture in assessing its “criminality.”  In
Part V, I show that our present focus in the immigration context on an
individuated intent to torture is misguided.  Instead, immigration judges
and their reviewing courts should focus on public information about a
state’s policies and assess how they reflect on the motivation behind that
policy.  And to the extent these immigration courts serve a humanitarian
function, they should de-emphasize transparency, which is relevant only
to the quasi-criminal character of the state policy.
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
The crime of torture is ultimately perpetrated by individuals.  The
CAT obligates states to criminalize torture and to prosecute individuals
guilty of torture.14  But the CAT is primarily concerned with torture that
is the consequence of a state policy.  After all, cruelty by private
individuals unrelated to state activity does not qualify as torture.  Under
Article 1 of CAT, to qualify as torture an act must be inflicted “[b]y or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity.”15  This is consistent with
customary international law.16
Which actors qualify as “public officials” raises interesting and
important questions of its own.  My aim here, however, is to understand
what kind of involvement will make torture more than an individual
crime by the particular official who inflicts it.  The nature of involvement
will turn on what actual steps were or were not taken by the government
14. See CAT, supra note 2, arts. 4-7.
15. See CAT, supra note 2, at art.1.
16. For example, a policeman torturing in violation of a national constitution and on
his own authority, would not be violating international customary law. Louis Henkin,
Remarks on Draft Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(Revised), 76 SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 184, 190 (1982).
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or officials other than the one who directly inflicted torture.  But because
torture is an intentional act, torture by a state also requires that we
understand what degree of intentionality we must attribute to the state
before holding it responsible for, and then culpable of, torture as a state
policy.  The state’s mental state comprises both its choice of action or
inaction and the reasons behind those choices.  State torture might
encompass all acts of torture by state actors that are traceable to active or
passive choices made by the state, or it might further require that those
choices be made with particular motivations.  The content of the intent
requirement for states has not been adequately elaborated because there
has been no opportunity for either the drafters of relevant statutes, or
courts interpreting those statutes, to construct a coherent and morally
compelling account that is more than a political compromise.17
A. International Law of State-Directed Torture
Recent progress made in establishing international criminal law on
firmer footing has taken place almost entirely in the realm of individual
criminality.18  Through international tribunals and now the International
Criminal Court, individuals who formerly would have escaped legal
consequence for torture by virtue of sovereign immunity or political
compromise now face a greater threat of prosecution by the international
community.  Individualizing responsibility for state crimes through
criminal law produces a handful of the guilty but many false innocents.19
Perhaps more problematically, it fails to recognize, let alone redress, the
special wrong embodied in state complicity in or even state organization
of an atrocity, including the administration of torture for state ends.
Nigel Rodley identifies three pillars to a legal understanding of
torture in the international community: intensity of pain; purposiveness;
and the public status of the perpetrator.20  The 1998 Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court departs from this understanding in Article
7(2)(e), in that no specific purpose is needed to prove the crime of torture
17. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 818 (D.C.  Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring) (“Nations rely chiefly on diplomacy and other political tools in their
dealings with each other, and these means are frequently incompatible with declarations
of legal rights . . . [o]ne consequence is that international law has not been extensively
developed through judicial decisions.”).
18. This trend began after World War II with the Nuremberg Trials and subsequent
codification of the Nuremberg principles by the newly constituted International Law
Commission. See JORGENSEN, supra note 8, at 27.
19. Ruth Jamieson & Kieran McEvoy, State Crime by Proxy and Judicial Othering,
45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 504, 521 (2005).
20. Nigel Rodley, The Definition(s) of Torture in International Law, in CURRENT
LEGAL PROBLEMS 467, 468 (M.D.A. Freeman ed., 2002).
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and there is no mention of the public status of the perpetrator.21  But
Rodley points out that every other instrument defining torture
incorporates a purposive element22: Article 1 of the UN Declaration and
Convention Against Torture,23 Article 2 of the Inter-American Torture
Convention,24 and the Elements of Crimes concerning the war crime of
torture under the ICC Statute in respect of international armed conflict
(Article 8(2)(a)(ii).1) and of non-international armed conflict (Article
8(2)(c)(i).4).25  He suggests that the absence of these basic elements in
the Rome Statute may reflect the fact that the Rome Statute is restricted
to individual penal responsibility, while the other instruments attempt to
codify international human rights law, which in principle involves the
establishment of state responsibility.26
The International Law Commission drafted a code on state
responsibility in 1973, which was has been the subject of extended
review, criticism, and revision.27  The initial draft by Special Rapporteur
Roberto Ago included a category labeled “state crime,” but after much
debate that section was omitted in the final version.  The revision, which
replaced the notion of “crime” with that of “serious breach,” was
prompted in large part by the objections raised by those who feared that,
by distinguishing in draft Article 19 between “crimes” and “delicts,” the
proposed code would have led to a “criminalization of responsibility.”28
It was argued that criminalization was, if not misguided, at least
premature given limited state precedent and the failure to construct a
legal system specifically tailored to international state crimes.29  For
example, the requirement under draft Article 19 that “it must be
recognized as a crime by [the international] community as a whole” was
especially contentious because it was argued that this requirement
rendered the whole notion of a state crime uncertain and subjective.30
21. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
22. Rodley, supra note 20, at 481.
23. See CAT, supra note 2.
24. Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture art. 2, Dec. 9, 1985,
O.A.S. T.S. No. 67, 25 I.L.M. 519.
25. See Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 8.
26. Id. at 469-70; see also Rodley, supra note 20, at 487.
27. See International Law Commission, Code on State Responsibility, (1973),
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/9_6.htm.
28. Eric Wyler, From ‘State Crime’ to Responsibility for ‘Serious Breaches of
Obligations under Peremptory Norms of General International Law’, 13 EUROPEAN J.
INT’L L. 1147, 1148 (2002).
29. Id. at 1148.
30. Alain Pellet, Can a State Commit a Crime?  Definitely, Yes!, 10 EUROPEAN J.
INT’L L. 425, 427 (1999).
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Moreover, perhaps because no institutions exist capable of
administering sanctions of a penal nature against a state, or even of
enforcing an order of cessation, the primary consequence of state crime
has always been envisioned as money damages.  Critics of the ILC draft
emphasized this civil aspect of the law of state responsibility.31
However, as Eric Wyler observes, the absence of a centralized authority
capable of imposing effective sanctions is inconsistent with domestic
civil legal orders as well.32
Others concede that state crime is not analogous to domestic crime
but nevertheless support the creation of international treaties, codes, and
institutions capable of adequately handling would-be state crime.33
Pellet observes that state crime does have distinctive aspects that warrant
treatment separate from that of ordinary international delicts.  He
observes:
[W]hen a state breaches an international obligation essential for the
interests of the international community as a whole, it never acts by
chance or unintentionally; therefore, the elements of intent and of
fault, which are not necessarily present in other internationally
wrongful acts, are part of the crimes, exactly as they are part of penal
infractions in domestic laws.  Moreover, even without a judge, the
reactions of the international community to a crime clearly include
punitive aspects.34
Therefore, it is not necessary to conflate state and individual crime in
order to distinguish state crime from other wrongful conduct by states.
But given this preliminary debate regarding the existence of state
crime and its status as a legal concept, it is not surprising that no
substantial attention has been devoted to understanding what would-be
state crime would entail were it ever to be recognized as a distinct legal
category.35  This article attempts to redress this important gap, with
focused attention on the intent requirement as applied to states.
One might question the utility of fleshing out the concept of state
crime in the absence of institutions authorized to enforce state criminal
or quasi-criminal responsibility.  But there are a number of benefits to
thinking through the meaning of state torture at this stage.  First, the
31. Wyler, supra note 28, at 1148-49. The ILC in fact had long ago rejected the
possibility of state criminal responsibility on these grounds. See 2 ILC YEARBOOK 128
(1964).
32. Wyler, supra note 28, at 1149.
33. Pellet, supra note 30, at 434.
34. Id.
35. Notably, developed Western states, including the United States, have been more
skeptical about the concept of state criminality than developing and East European states.
See JORGENSEN, supra note 8, at 255-56.
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development of institutions capable of exacting consequences for state
crimes like torture may depend on further development of the concept.
International legal norms are recognized as such only after they have
either been codified by treaty or otherwise have plausibly attained the
status of “almost-universally accepted” norms.  Discussion over the
merits of a category of state crime, or the contours of any like category,
would profit from more sustained discussion about what state crime
entails.
Second, although states presently face nothing like criminal
responsibility for their most terrible conduct, even today there are
various contexts for the assessment of state conduct.  Besides the tort and
immigration contexts discussed below, truth and justice commissions are
faced with many of the normative questions raised by a regime of quasi-
criminal responsibility.  It also behooves all those engaged in critical
scrutiny of state conduct, from domestic and foreign press to NGOs and
foreign states, to develop the conceptual tools needed to name state
crime.  Finally, a better understanding of state torture and its particular
wrongs may positively influence the development of domestic norms
intended to guide the conduct of state actors.  That is, if we know what
state torture is, it may be less likely to happen.
B. Domestic Law of Torture
The legal concept of torture has been given shape in domestic law
through litigation in two contexts: tort claims against foreign states and
claims by aliens that they are entitled to withholding of removal under
the CAT.  In the former context, the concepts and legal norms
surrounding statehood have limited the development of a coherent
jurisprudence of torture on two fronts.  The discussion below
demonstrates, first, that consistent with prevailing international law of
torture, only acts traceable to state authority are actionable as torture.
Second, also consistent with international respect for sovereignty, states
themselves have been in almost all cases immune from tort liability.  As
a result, there has been little opportunity for courts to define the
boundaries of the intent requirement for state torture while adjudicating
tort claims.
The second context, i.e. withholding of removal, has progressed
further substantively, but in a manner that has misled rather than
enlightened observers as to the legal significance of torture as a state act.
Aliens otherwise eligible for removal from the United States frequently
seek to avoid removal by seeking protection under the CAT.  In this
context, immigration judges and federal courts of appeal have had
occasion to grapple with the contours of the intent requirement in torture.
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However, as discussed below, the question of intent has been misframed,
and the resulting case law, misguided.
Recently, there has been a third legal front for the law of torture.
The Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush Administration repeatedly
visited the question of defining torture, so as to ensure that all legally
available means are employed by U.S. agents in the War on Terror,
among other wars.36  Its initial efforts to preserve the widest possible
sphere of action produced a shockingly hollow understanding of the
limits on torture by U.S. agents.37  Those standards were revised, and
have motivated a public discussion of the appropriate boundaries on state
behavior, but the narrow conception of torture initially espoused
continues to have lingering effects on judicial understanding of torture.38
1. Tort Claims Against Foreign States
Victims of torture and other state crimes have repeatedly attempted
to bring foreign state actors to justice in U.S. courts.  After all, U.S. law
recognizes state responsibility for torture.  The Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations provides that torture by a state is a violation of
international law, and sets forth conditions under which states may be
subject to scrutiny by other states.39  However, generally only individuals
associated with foreign states, rather than the states themselves, have
been held accountable.  Although statutes have been enacted with the
specific intent to aid these plaintiffs, thus far, there has been limited
occasion to test the scope of liability allowed, and there is reason to
believe that new statutes intended to confirm liability will be of limited
utility.
The Alien Torts Claims Act appeared to make it possible for some
plaintiffs to pursue tort claims against their home governments in U.S.
courts.  However, in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp.,40 the Supreme Court held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act precludes construction of the Alien Torts Claims Act to grant U.S.
courts jurisdiction over foreign states.41  The Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1991 provides for civil actions against individuals acting under
36. See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J.
Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) (compiling Bush administration memoranda
justifying the use of torture).
37. See Yoo, supra note 12; Bybee, supra note 12.
38. See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., to James B.
Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000dd (Supp. V 2005). See infra Section 3 regarding residual effect of initial
standards.
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, §§ 701, 702 (1986).
40. 488 U.S. 428 (1988).
41. Id. at 434, 436-38.
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actual or apparent state authority.42  Its definition of torture parallels that
of the CAT.43  Since amended in 1996 by the U.S. Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act has
made an exception for state immunity in cases involving terrorism,
including torture.44  Under the revised act, as further amended by
National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2008, states may
be liable for money damages resulting from personal injury or death
caused by an act of torture.45  However, defendants must be officially
designated as “state sponsors of terrorism,” and either the victim or the
claimant must be a U.S. national.  The non-judicial role in designating
states as “rogue” means that the final determination of state liability for
torture will remain outside the hands of the judiciary.46  Moreover, since
proportionally few victims of torture by foreign states are U.S. nationals,
and since victims have no expectation of recovering damages on an
unenforceable verdict, there is limited incentive on either side of these
suits to develop a jurisprudence of state torture.
To be sure, the prospect of holding states responsible for torture
they have directed is less distant than it once was.  Over one hundred
years ago, in Underhill v. Hernandez,47 the Supreme Court first set out
the Act of State doctrine, which might have shut the door to state
responsibility altogether.48  The Underhill Court held that:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory.  Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
powers as between themselves.49
42. See TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT OF 1991 § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
43. See TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT OF 1991 § 3(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
See also Doe v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1315 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (stating that the
TVPA definition mirrors that in CAT).
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2000). See also Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 45 (D.D.C. 2001) (observing that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act suspends immunity for acts of torture); Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
154 F. Supp. 2d 27, 29, 32 n.6 (D.D.C. 2001) (same); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146
F. Supp. 2d 19, 25 (D.D.C. 2001) (same).
45. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181,
§ 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 338-44 (2008).
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A). See also Jason Binimow & Amy Bunk,
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of “Foreign Terrorist Organization”
Provision of Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1189, 178 A.L.R. FED. 535 (2002).
47. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
48. Id. at 254.
49. Id. at 252.
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However, this doctrine, intended at least in part to defer to the executive
branch’s authority in matters of foreign relations, was narrowed
considerably by the so-called Tate Letter.  This letter from Jack B. Tate,
Acting Legal Adviser in the Department of State, to Acting Attorney
General Philip Perlman on May 19, 1952, shifted U.S. foreign immunity
doctrine such that only public acts of foreign governments would be
covered.50  Courts subsequently adopted this restriction on the Act of
State doctrine, following the rule that in order for the Act of State
doctrine to apply, an action must be governmental or public.51  Thus,
secret, possibly illegal acts by officers of the state may be official but not
protected acts of state.52  The next step seemed finally to establish state
responsibility, for torture at least.  Congress provided that, because
torture is never done as a matter of public policy, Act of State doctrine
does not apply.53
Importantly, while torture will never qualify as an “act of state,” it
may nevertheless be conducted under color of governmental authority
such that it can meet the legal definition of torture.54  Notwithstanding
the fact that U.S. courts are now available as forums for civil claims by
torture victims against foreign states under certain circumstances, there
have been no cases in which a foreign state has actually been forced to
pay a torture victim any sum as a result of a U.S. civil action.  This does
not mean that no progress has been made.55  But it means that we are a
long way from a developed domestic jurisprudence regarding the
contours of the crime of torture as perpetrated by states.
2. Withholding of Removal
Article 3 of the CAT prohibits refoulement or deportation to a state
where there are substantial grounds for believing that a person may be
subjected to torture.56  This paper does not directly raise the question of
50. See Letter from Jack B. Tate to Philip Perlman, reprinted in 26 DEP’T OF STATE
BULL. 984-85 (1952).
51. This development took place on the heels of an international trend away from
absolute state immunity to a rule of restrictive state immunity. See ROSANE VAN
ALEBEEK, THE IMMUNITY OF STATES AND THEIR OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 14, 17 (2008). However, in practice
immunity decisions remained political. Id. at 32.
52. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
53. S. Rep. No. 249, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. at 8 (1991).
54. See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
55. See Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts between Foreign
Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071 (1985) (arguing that there is value to
legal statement of the unlawfulness of torture even where a court lacks authority to
enforce it).
56. See CAT, supra note 2, art. 3.
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whether a participating state has already committed torture, though that
is the best evidence of the prospect of torture in the future.
Notwithstanding this unusual, forward-oriented dimension to the Article
3 inquiry, it has dominated matters arising under the CAT before the
Committee Against Torture, an international committee set up to
administer the treaty.57  It is also the context in which torture has been
most frequently litigated in domestic courts.
Article 1 defines torture as “any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person” for certain prohibited purposes.58  The Drafting Committee of
the CAT provided that the requirement that torture be intentionally
inflicted should be understood to require only general intent.59  However,
in its ratification of the treaty, the U.S. Senate imposed its own
understanding of the treaty to require specific intent.60  Implementing
regulation Section 208.18(a)(5) reflects the Senate’s understanding.
In the Senate’s resolution, the Senate further expressed its
understanding that, while acquiescence of a public official in torture
committed by third parties might qualify as torture under Article 1,
warranting protection under Article 3, for an act to be taken with the
“acquiescence” of a public official, the official must “prior to the activity
constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter
breach his legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.”61
The Senate Report clarifies that “[a]wareness” includes “both actual
knowledge and ‘willful blindness.’”62
The Senate did not elaborate the meaning of the term “specific
intent,” or the other legal terms used in its statements of its
understanding.  The Board of Immigration Appeals has looked to
domestic criminal law to inform its interpretation.  In In re J-E-,63 the
BIA cited Black’s Law Dictionary to define specific intent as the “intent
to accomplish the precise criminal act that one is later charged with”
while “general intent” commonly “takes the form of recklessness or
57. Sarah Joseph, Committee Against Torture: Recent Jurisprudence, 6 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 571, 574 (2006).
58. CAT, supra note 2, art. 1.
59. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE—A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 41 (Martinus Nijhoff
1988).
60. It also substantially narrowed the circumstances under which mental suffering
would qualify. U.S. reservations, declarations, and understandings, Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 136 CONG.
REC. S17486 (1990).
61. Id. at 17491-92 (1990).
62. S. EXEC. REP. No. 101-30 at 9 (1990).
63. 23 I&N Dec. 291 (BIA 2002).
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negligence.”64  It went on to hold that Haitian prison officials who
maintained horrendous conditions did not commit torture because the
prison conditions were not the result of a specific intent to inflict pain or
suffering, but just the result of budgetary and management problems.65
Only isolated instances of police mistreatment in the prisons might rise
to the level of torture.66  Courts of Appeals, applying a highly deferential
degree of scrutiny, have in several instances endorsed this interpretation
of the CAT.  For example, in Auguste v. Ridge, the Third Circuit
declined to “say that the BIA erred in its interpretation of the ‘specific
intent’ requirement in In re J-E by defining that term as it is ordinarily
used in American criminal law.”67
A number of observers have challenged the specific intent
requirement, and others have questioned its application in cases like In re
J-E and Auguste.  My purpose is to elaborate precisely why specific
intent, as least as it has been construed in American criminal law, is not
the appropriate standard, in light of the purposes of the prohibition on
state torture.  While it is likely that the substitution of general intent for
specific intent will result in a more lenient standard for withholding
removal, there are independent moral reasons to prefer a standard that
does not appeal to this domestic distinction at all.
3. Office of Legal Counsel
While it may be tempting to dismiss the attempts to define torture
by the Bush Administration’s Office of the General Counsel as
politically motivated, their legal effect may endure even though the
Administration has since renounced the more narrow standards it initially
promoted.  The actions and policies of the Administration have been
widely reviewed and criticized and it is not my aim here to review that
literature.68  But relevant specifically to the question of defining intent in
torture is the 2002 opinion issued by the Office of Legal Counsel of the
Department of Justice in which it defined specific intent under the CAT
narrowly along the lines of domestic criminal law.  Mere knowledge by
an interrogator that pain was a likely result of her actions would not be
64. Id. at 301.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 302.
67. Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 145 (3d Cir. 2005).
68. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, The Example of America, 119 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 1
(2009); JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S UNLAWFUL
RESPONSES IN THE “WAR” ON TERROR (2007); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive
Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005); Seth
Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture in
the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278 (2003).
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sufficient.  More generally, the treaty was construed narrowly and
established strikingly permissive guidelines with respect to torture.69
The Board of Immigration Appeals was influenced by the opinion
of the Office of Legal Counsel in its In re J-E decision.  Although the
narrow 2002 opinion definition was renounced in a December 30, 2004
Opinion by the Attorney General, the BIA continues to apply the narrow
standard.70  While we can expect to the BIA standard to eventually take a
more palatable form even on its existing course, one may suspect that
judicial inertia is reinforced by the absence of a developed conception of
state intent relevant to the torture inquiry.  Again, this paper aims to
begin to remedy this gap.
II. THE MORAL RELEVANCE OF STATE INTENT
The first problem with the resort to domestic criminal law in
defining state crime lies in the subjective approach to intention prevalent
in domestic law.71  The weight of subjective intent has been
controversial, and contemporary criminal theory has cast doubt upon it.
Nevertheless, even today, subjective intent, that is, the actual intent of
the defendant, is generally thought to be important in criminal law
because of its relation to blameworthiness.72  Blameworthiness in turn is
taken to justify the imposition of punishment.  Punishment in the
domestic criminal law context usually takes the form of substantially
depriving the defendant of her liberty, to a far greater extent than would
normally be permissible in the absence of a criminal conviction.
Other considerations may also be important to blameworthiness,
such as the harm resulting from a defendant’s actions and even the
reasonableness of defendant’s subjective view.  But as the authority to
punish is often viewed as dependent on an individual defendant’s
capacity to choose between right and wrong, it is not surprising that the
nature of the choice actually made would be seen as critical to assessing
69. See Internal Memorandum from the Office of the General Counsel, Compliance
with Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture in the Cases of Removable Aliens, at 4
(May 14, 1997).
70. See Renee Redman, Defining “Torture”: The Collateral Effect on Immigration
Law of the Attorney General’s Narrow Interpretation of ‘Specifically Intended’ When
Applied to United States Interrogators, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 465 (2007).
71. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil
Law Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1878 (1992) (“Most
commentators acknowledge that the following attributes tend to distinguish the criminal
law from the civil law: (1) the greater role of intent in the criminal law, with its emphasis
on subjective awareness rather than objective reasonableness. . . .”).
72. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1985) (refusing to construe
ambiguous statute as criminalizing conduct in the absence of criminal intent, because the
mens rea requirement reflects “belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent
ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.”).
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the criminal act.  If we may only be held responsible for acts over which
we have control, we must be culpable for the manner in which we have
exercised that control before we can be blamed for the harm we cause.73
While evil intent alone is never enough to justify punishment, some
degree of mal intent has long been regarded as essential to the conditions
of legitimate punishment.74
It is not my purpose here to defend this understanding of mens rea
in criminal law; my observation is only that it appears to explain at least
in part the resilient status of subjective intent in domestic criminal law.
But whatever the merits of the reasoning above, it does not apply to
states.  State responsibility, even quasi-criminal liability, for torture does
not result in a deprivation of state liberty; indeed, there is rarely a
question of depriving a state of even its sovereignty on the grounds of
some past offense.  The rights associated with sovereignty are of far
more dubious pedigree than those associated with individual liberty, in
any case.75  While the normative force of liberty stems from a conception
of the person as one capable of and entitled to shape her own conception
of the good life, the normative force of sovereignty turns on contingent
claims about the role of state institutions in delivering peace and
prosperity to individuals and groups within its jurisdiction.  Even
Thomas Hobbes, an especially stalwart defender of the prerogatives of
the sovereign, defended sovereignty and its powers on the grounds that it
was most conducive to the welfare of the sovereign’s subjects.76  In
practice, states respect the sovereignty of other states for self-interested
reasons and under the imperative of avoiding the moral catastrophe of
73. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, which sets forth the “minimum requirements of
culpability.”  Subsection (1) provides that, with limited exception, “a person is not guilty
of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law
may require, with respect to each material element of the offense.”
74. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 114 (1968) (“All civilized
penal systems make liability to punishment for at any rate serious crime dependent not
merely on the fact that the person to be punished has done the outward act of a crime, but
on his having done it in a certain state of frame of mind or will.”); MICHAEL S. MOORE,
PLACING BLAME 191 (1998) (“Any plausible theory of punishment gives some prominent
role to the desert of offenders.”). Moore contrasts the orthodox view, in which both
culpability and wrongdoing matter to just deserts, with the subjective view, in which
culpability alone determines extent of responsibility. Id.
75. See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999); Judith
Resnik and Julie Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in
Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2003); see also Ken Booth, Three
Tyrannies, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 64-65 (Tim Dunne & Nicholas
Wheeler eds., 1999).
76. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 23 (Oskar Piest ed., 1958) (“For by art is created
that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE-in Latin CIVITAS-
which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for
whose protection and defense it was intended; and in which, the sovereignty is an
artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body.”) (emphasis added).
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war.  Thus, sovereignty is upheld even where states fail to serve the
instrumental role that might best justify their institutional existence in the
abstract.
This brings us to a more fundamental disanalogy with domestic
criminal law.  States are moral agents in a more literal sense than are
persons.  Like persons, states can make moral claims on others, and
others may make moral claims on them.  But while moral constraints on
individuals usually arise from others’ interests, individuals are not
morally obligated to always pursue other individuals’ interests, or at
least, they are usually permitted to give priority to their own interests and
those of others in their circle.  Individuals acting in pursuit of their own
interest do not need to justify their actions except inasmuch as they
impinge on the rights of others or to the extent they do so in a manner
connected with a collective failure to fulfill their obligations toward
others.77  Individuals are taken to have their own life projects and
conceptions of the good, which have morally salient value not only for
themselves but, to a more limited extent, for others just by virtue of the
fact that they have been adopted by a moral agent.  Our moral capacity to
create value is at the root of the self-justifying character of human
endeavor, and it is that capacity in others that imposes constraints on
how we may pursue our respective projects and goods, and creates
certain kinds of obligations to them.
States, on the other hand, are—or should be—entirely servile
creatures.  In prevailing liberal democratic theory, states are not just
constrained by individuals’ values but their existence is motivated by the
projects and values of the individuals they govern.78  To the extent a state
fails to serve the purpose of facilitating individuals’ pursuit of their
separately or commonly held conceptions of the good life, it ceases to
fulfill its function.  Even illiberal states purport to facilitate the pursuit of
77. See THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 14 (1991) (“From his own point
of view within the world each person, with his particular concerns and attachments, is
extremely important to himself, and is situated at the center of a set of concentric circles
of rapidly diminishing identification with others. But from the impersonal standpoint
which he can also occupy, so is everyone else: Everyone’s life matters as much as his
does, and his matters no more than anyone else’s.”). Nagel describes two moral
standpoints, and it is one of the central tasks of political theory to integrate them, or
rather, it is one of the central tasks of political institutions to make it possible for
individuals to integrate them. Id. at 14, 86.
78. This is implicit in the idea of the social contract. In the liberal contractarian
tradition, the boundaries and obligations of the state are those to which individuals
subject to its powers would assent. Individuals consent, albeit hypothetically, to the
state’s monopoly of power at least in part because doing so ultimately enables them to
pursue their separately conceived plans. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11
(1971) (describing the theory of social contract found in Locke, Rousseau and Kant, and
the one in which his own theory is rooted).
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the good life among some group.  That group may be ethnically or
religiously defined, and/or the state may be premised on a particular
theory of that good—rather than leaving it, to the extent possible, to
individuals to define for themselves—but the state nevertheless justifies
itself and its powers with reference to the good of its constituents.
Indeed, even undemocratic states claim to act on behalf of the governed,
and most defend their undemocratic practices on the theory that their
authoritarian structure better serves the real interests of the people.
Given their inevitable claim to serve the interests of those over
whom they exercise power, states are subject to more robust moral
constraints; they are bound not just to respect, by not interfering with, but
to affirmatively promote, the good of those they govern.  Accordingly,
the more significant moral question with respect to the moral character of
a state is not whether they have violated a moral code of conduct but
whether they fulfill the affirmative moral function of a state.  The former
question, whether one has violated a moral rule, speaks to
blameworthiness.  We commonly think of the latter question, whether a
state may be viewed as fulfilling the function that justifies its powers, as
one of legitimacy—the legitimacy of political authority.79
A. Legitimate Authority, Legitimate State Action and Objective Intent
Is the state legitimate?  That question is sometimes asked with
respect to the general concept of statehood, but it rarely arises with
respect to a particular state.  When it does, it is not really a legal
question.  But in the context of state crime, we appropriately ask: Does
the challenged state action undermine the legitimacy of the state?  That
79. See, e.g., G.E.M. Anscombe, On the Source of the Authority of the State, 20
RATIO 1, 27-28 (1978) (“authority in the command of violence (which . . . distinguish[es]
government from a Mafia in control of a place) is based on its performance of a task
which is a general human need,” in particular, the administration of justice); Jeremy
Waldron, Kant’s Legal Positivism, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1535 (1996) (explaining Kant’s
view that law and political authority are necessary to enable peaceful co-existence under
conditions of profound moral disagreement); PENNY GREEN & TONY WARD, STATE
CRIME: GOVERNMENTS, VIOLENCE AND CORRUPTION 3 (2004) (noting that sociologists
and political scientists often refer to legitimacy as that which “distinguishes state
coercion from the naked violence of ‘robber bands’”); FREDERICK DUNN, THE
PROTECTION OF NATIONALS: A STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 134
(1932) (“[T]he primary purpose of political organization . . . is to maintain conditions
under which social life is possible.”); Michael Phillips, The Justification of Punishment
and the Justification of Political Authority, 5 LAW AND PHIL. 393, 397 (1986) (“[]tate
authority is justified to begin with at least partly by the need of a society effectively to
prevent or deter certain types of acts.”); Jerome Hall, Authority and the Law in
AUTHORITY 64 (Carl Friedrich ed., 1958) (“[A]lthough authority is not an expression of
reason, it presupposes, at least in a democracy, that reason and science have been put to
the maximum use to solve the problem in hand.”).
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question must be answered with reference to the conditions of legitimacy
for political authority, though it does not require an exhaustive or
complete set of criteria for legitimacy.  I make the limited claim that the
legitimacy-factor in state action turns substantially on the objective intent
behind the action, i.e., the affirmative as well as the background reasons
which apparently motivated the action in question.
Under such an objective approach, the otherwise important
distinction between advertence and motivation all but collapses.  Almost
all state action, and certainly acts that might constitute torture, are
traceable to some reason, and importantly, will be traced to a reason by
the public.  Even unplanned action is, and will be perceived as, the
product of choices regarding structures of accountability, as well as
choices regarding the vigor (and funding) with which certain state
purposes are to be pursued, such as security or the protection of human
rights.  In the context of state crime, we are interested in whether certain
prohibited reasons are present in the apparent calculus behind the
allocation of state resources and methods of governance.  The presence
of reasons which would detract from the legitimacy of the political
authority renders the action in question illegitimate.
A legitimate political authority is one which we are bound morally
to obey, or at least, one which we may normally choose to obey without
compromising our individual autonomy.80  In order to be able to
80. See Immanuel Kant, On the Common Saying: ‘This May Be True in Theory, But
It Does Not Apply in Practice’, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 73-79 (Hans Reiss ed.,
H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) (arguing that state coercion may be justified in order to create
and maintain conditions of rational freedom, i.e., a civil society governed by laws which
could be willed by those governed); Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical
Sketch, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 112-13 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991);
JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, KANT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 91-95 (1994) (explaining Kant’s
views); Jeffrie Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 217 (1973).
See also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 191 (1986) (“A state is legitimate if its
constitutional structure and practice are such that its citizens have a general obligation to
obey political decisions that purport to impose duties on them.”); EQUALITY AND
PARTIALITY, supra note 77, at 8 (“The pure ideal of political legitimacy is that the use of
state power should be capable of being authorized by each citizen—not in direct detail
but through acceptance of the principles, institutions, and procedures which determine
how that power will be used.”). See also Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 2029, 2035 (2003) (“[A] strong claim of sovereignty by a state that is committing
human rights abuses will not be respected by the international community.”); Thomas
Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 50 (1992)
(“Legitimacy, in turn, is the quality of a rule, or a system of rules, or a process for making
or interpreting rules that pulls both the rule makers and those addressed by the rules
toward voluntary compliance.”); BETRAND DE JOUVENEL, SOVEREIGNTY: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE POLITICAL GOOD 33 (J.F. Huntington trans., 1957) (“Authority ends where
voluntary assent ends. There is in every state a margin of obedience that is won only by
the use of force or by the threat of force: it is this margin which breaches liberty and
demonstrates the failure of authority.”).
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rationally obey the state for reasons compatible with our autonomy, and
not just out of fear of coercion, we must be able to view the state as a
moral agent acting on our behalf.  One might take the position that we
are morally bound to obey political authority, without further inquiry into
its legitimacy.  (This Hobbesian position might appear at first blush
rather authoritarian, but one could argue that the moral obligation is often
overcome by other obligations.)  However, even philosophers with a
radical commitment to political authority as such are likely to agree that
the reasons for our duty to obey are bound up with some expectation of
the function that political authority serves.81  Even if the state’s failure to
adequately fulfill this function does not eviscerate a duty to obey, it at
least undercuts the rationale behind a duty to obey and thereby weakens
it.  Likewise, one might reject a duty to obey even a legitimate political
authority.  But most will nevertheless concede that the fact that
something is required, prohibited, or permitted by law may create
reasons for action or inaction.82  One might then regard the problem of
legitimacy as having to do with securing the proper weight for those
reasons, which will turn on whether the state performs the function
which would justify giving its directives weight.
My argument with respect to state intent does not require agreement
on the nature of our relationship with authority.  We need only see
political authority as serving some function and the legitimacy of
authority as turning on the conditions for rational belief that it serves
such a function.  We need not agree on what that function is.  The state’s
function, or our reasons for following its directives, may be relatively
banal, having only to do with the state’s coordinative function, such as
building roads or setting and enforcing traffic laws.  Or that function may
be moral.  The state may be the means by which we achieve peaceful co-
existence, or the means by which we fulfill political moral duties, such as
those of distributive justice, arising from our interdependence.  Its
directives may be our best bet at acting on the totality of reasons which
apply to us in the usual case, given its superior information on a range of
issues.  The state may be the means by which we achieve the kind of free
and just society in which our and others’ desired lives are possible.
These possible statements of the moral function of the state overlap
considerably.  Whatever reason we may have for deferring to, or at least
respecting political authority, we can evaluate individual state actions by
81. See HOBBES, supra note 76.
82. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY
245 (Oxford Univ. Press 1979) (“One has moral reasons to act in conformity with the
laws of a good system more often than those of a bad system even if there is no special
moral obligation to obey the laws of a just legal system.”).
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reference to that function by asking whether the action undermines or
reinforces our deferential or respectful attitude.
I have framed the question of legitimacy in terms of individuals’
reasons to obey the law.  This is consistent with the emphasis in
contemporary jurisprudence on law’s claim to be a legitimate authority83
and the fundamental problem of accounting for the normative power of
legal directives.  It is also consistent with a longstanding practice in
political science and sociology of explaining and assessing legitimacy in
terms of the beliefs and perceptions of the governed toward authority.84
Most notably, in his influential account of authority, Max Weber
identified authority by reference to sustained compliance with
directives.85  He also observed that most effective authorities claim
legitimacy and are indeed regarded as legitimate,86 and he identified
different modal-types of legitimacy based on the distinct grounds upon
which those subject to authority are called upon to view, and in fact
view, that authority as authoritative.87
A number of critics reject Weber’s approach on the ground that it
appears to de-normatize the concept of legitimacy in two respects.  First,
inasmuch as popular support or consent is measured on behavioral
criteria alone, i.e., apparently voluntary compliance with state directives,
legitimacy that depends just on such support characterizes any stable
government and would thus appear to render all effective political
authority legitimate—including brutal dictatorial regimes that are widely
perceived as ruthless and cruel.88  Such a notion of legitimacy would
seem to lack a means by which to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate
authority.89  Any stable state not racked by violent rebellion is
83. See, e.g., id. at 30 (“[I]t is an essential feature of law that it claims legitimate
authority. . . .”).
84. See John Schaar, Legitimacy in the Modern State, in POWER AND COMMUNITY IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE 283-84 (Philip Green & Sanford Levinson eds., Random House 1970)
(stating three prevailing accounts of legitimate authority in political science and noting
that they all turn on belief, citing SEYMOUR LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES
OF POLITICS 77 (Doubleday 1960); Robert Bierstedt, Legitimacy, in DICTIONARY OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 386 (Free Press 1964); Richard Merelman, Learning and Legitimacy,
60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 548 (1966)).
85. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY
212, 946, 948 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Univ. of Calif. Press 1978).
86. Id. at 213, 953-54.
87. Id. at 36.
88. See HANNA PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE 283 (Univ. of Calif. Press 1972)
(Weber’s subjects are “taken to consider a government or a law as legitimate if they act
as if they do”); see also Robert Grafstein, The Failure of Weber’s Conception of
Legitimacy: Its Causes and Implications, 43 J. OF POL. 456 (1981).
89. See Regina Titunik, Democracy, Domination and Legitimacy in Max Weber’s
Political Thought, in MAX WEBER’S ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: A CRITICAL COMPANION
144-45 (Camic et al eds., Stanford Univ. Press 2005) (“Weber’s use of the term
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characterized by what formally qualifies as voluntary compliance, and if
such compliance is the only evidence of consent available to us as
observers, we are unable to critique any effective authority as
illegitimate.
Second, inasmuch as popular support or consent is seen as the basis
for legitimacy without any reference to the institutions or policies which
are supported, bad governments supported by morally corrupt societies
would be deemed “legitimate.”90  We could not condemn as illegitimate
brutal popular governments, such as Nazi Germany, which are ruthless
and cruel but not necessarily perceived as such within the society
governed.  Critics along these lines insist that legitimacy must be a
property of state institutions and cannot be controlled or determined by
the governed, who may or may not identify or concern themselves with
the relevant properties of the state.91  Legitimacy is an entirely objective
conception directly assessable from an outsider’s vantage point, without
reference to the perspective of those called upon to obey political
authority.  On this view, the existence of a duty to obey law might still
identify or characterize all legitimate political authority, but the existence
of such a duty—and certainly the bare perception of such a duty—would
not constitute a legitimate regime.
These are powerful critiques of the Weberian concept of
legitimacy.92  However, they do not apply to my limited conception of
legitimacy, which turns not on actual belief in legitimacy per se but on
the conditions for rational belief in a duty to obey or the accordance of
substantial weight to legal directives.  This approach is motivated
expressly by the normative significance of belief, in light of the moral
legitimate . . . does not indicate [objective or normative validity]. It was not Weber’s
intention to establish criteria of legitimacy and illegitimacy. Indeed he developed no
category of illegitimate rule in the sense of rule without right.”); Wolfgang Mommsen,
Discussion on Max Weber and Power-Politics, in MAX WEBER AND SOCIOLOGY TODAY
114 (Otto Stammer ed., Kathleen Morris trans., Blackwell 1971) (“[T]here is no concept
of non-legitimate rule in Weber’s sociology of government”).
90. Id. at 284, 286 (such a conception of legitimacy “dissolves legitimacy into
acceptance or acquiescence” makes it “entirely a matter of sentiment”).
91. See PITKIN, supra note 88, at 281-82 (“‘legitimate’ means something like
‘lawful, exemplary, binding’—not ‘what is commonly considered lawful, exemplary,
binding’ nor ‘what ought to be considered lawful, exemplary, binding’). Pikin argues
that Weber’s definition imputes “total irrationality and subjectivity” to his subjects by
failing to inquire into the criteria for their judgments of legitimacy. Id. at 283.
92. At least, they are powerful critiques of the over-extension of Weber’s operational
concepts outside of their intended domain. Weber was himself fully aware that his
assumptions might be false and did not intend the concepts of either authority or
legitimacy as normative ones. He was attempting to create conceptual categories that
would facilitate empirical observation, which would in turn enhance our understanding of
the various ways in which power is exercised (not the way it should be). See WEBER,
supra note 85, at 214.
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significance of compliance with law, and does not look to compliant
behavior as dispositive evidence of belief.  It does preserve the
fundamental notion, promoted by Weber but followed by numerous
sociologists and political scientists, that legitimacy is not a direct
property of institutions; rather, legitimacy is a condition that arises when
certain attitudinal conditions are in place for citizens governed by those
institutions.93  Despite its democratic emphasis, my working, partial
conception of legitimacy avoids the two most disputed aspects of
Weber’s approach: a reference to beliefs themselves, as opposed to the
conditions for rational belief, and the imputation of a belief in legitimacy
based solely on observed behavior, namely, obedience.  These
differences follow naturally from the normative character of my
argument and the decidedly non-normative stance adopted by Weber.
Thus, a fairly thin but still fruitful notion of legitimate authority
warrants focus, in evaluating state action, on whether citizens may view
that action as motivated by appropriate reasons, i.e., reasons compatible
with the state’s function.  Our view of the state’s reasons for its action
turns on its objective, or apparent, intent: the reasons which a reasonable
observer would attribute to the state.94  It is not a matter of individuals
weighing at each moment whether the cumulative actions of the
prevailing regime warrant deference.  Rather, the apparent motivations
for state actions create a public culture that mediates individual relations
with the state.95  The plausibility of the state fulfilling its function turns
93. The emphasis on the conditions for rational respect for authority is a common
theme in discourses on authority influenced by Kant. See supra note 84. See also
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 101, 105 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon
Press 1975) (arguing that the validity claims of norms issued by an authority depends on
at least “the conviction that consensus on a recommended norm could be brought about
with reasons,” i.e., that it could be “discursively redeemed”); CARL FRIEDRICH, MAN AND
HIS GOVERNMENT 218, 225 (McGraw Hill 1963) (“authority rests upon the ability to
issue communications which are capable of reasoned elaboration” but what is important
is “not the psychological concomitant of a belief in the capacity of the authority for such
reasoned elaboration” but “the actual presence of this capacity”). While “authority as the
capacity for reasoned elaboration is capable of creating legitimacy whenever it provides
good ‘reasons’ for the title to rule,” “legitimacy can be achieved only when there exists a
prevalent belief as to what provides a rightful title to rule.” Id. at 237.
94. See my related argument in Deliberative Autonomy and Legitimate State
Purpose under the First Amendment, 68 ALB. L. REV. 815, 834 (2005).
95. Cf. David Easton, The Perception of Authority and Political Change, in
Friedrich ed., supra note 79, at 188 (“The readiness of the members of a political system
to maintain or shift their support for political authorities is a function not only of who
they think the authorities are, but also of their perceptions of the way in which the
authorities act. Different images of the characteristics of political authority would result
in different types of responses to the demands imposed upon the members of a system by
these authorities, if only because we interpret the meaning of the acts of others in the
light of what we think of them.”); STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL: KNOWING ABOUT
ATROCITIES AND SUFFERING 76 (Polity 2001) (observing that disavowals of atrocities are
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on a public construction of state institutions and their avowed purposes.
In most regimes, because the moral function of the state is essential—
justice (of many types) is impossible without it—individuals can accept
an obligation to obey the law, and to respect political and legal authority
more generally, without forfeiting a sense of themselves as moral agents
in their own right.
It is clearly not the case that any time a state acts for apparent
reasons which its constituents could not endorse, the state, or even the
particular government in question, becomes illegitimate.  An individual
who commits an immoral act probably does not thereby become
generally “immoral.”  A single profitable transaction will not make a
corporation profitable.  An organization that effectively accomplishes
some project does not thereby become “effective.”  Nevertheless,
inasmuch as we aspire to be moral or profitable or effective, it makes
sense to assess individual acts in light of our larger aims, especially when
those aims are fundamental or our raison d’être.
Legitimacy serves as a reference point for evaluating state actions,
and in particular, the rationales behind them.  The conclusion of an
inquiry into a particular state action will either be that the action was
legitimate or not; the question of the legitimacy of the regime is usually
set aside or handled separately.  The fundamental criteria by which we
assess a state nevertheless inform the standard by which we can assess
particular exercises of state power.
The question of state crime is fundamentally about identifying those
acts which are never appropriate for a legitimate state.  Again, the
question is not whether a state that commits a state crime is immediately
rendered an illegitimate regime.  The point is rather that, in designating a
kind of state action as quasi-criminal, we indicate that those actions are
never legitimate, and that they pose at least the risk of undermining the
legitimacy of the state in the long-term.  Thus, we can understand the
question of state crime as one about the legitimacy of state action, rather
than the legitimacy of states directly.  Of course, the fact that a given
action is illegitimate does not thereby make it a state crime, any more
than the fact that an act is blameworthy renders it criminal from the
standpoint of domestic criminal law.  Before we designate acts as
criminal in domestic law, we appeal to additional criteria that identify
them as especially blameworthy; we further restrict criminality to acts
which are blameworthy for particular reasons.  Similarly, abuses of
power such as curtailing freedom of the press may be illegitimate, and
may undermine the legitimacy of the regime that adopts them, but most
not “private states of mind. They are embedded in popular culture, banal language codes
and state-encouraged legitimations.”).
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of us would not go so far as to designate those state actions as quasi-
criminal.96  If every human rights violation were deemed quasi-criminal,
the concept of state criminality would have no utility.97  We need not
96. At the moment, the outer boundaries of state crime are, like the concept of state
crime itself, deeply contested. As a matter of positive law one would rely primarily on
which crimes have been universally recognized, and in particular, those accepted as
subject to either the jurisdiction of the International Criminal court or universal
jurisdiction. ILC’s Draft Article 19 (ultimately rejected) attempted a more substantive
account, providing that a state crime could be “a serious breach of an international
obligation of essential importance for the maintenance of international peace and
security,” “the self-determination of peoples” or “the safeguarding and preservation of
the human environment,” or “a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international
obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human being, such as those
prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid.” DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY, art. 19, para. 3, [1976] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N (PT. 2), at 95, U.N. DOC.
E/CN.4/Ser.A/1976/Add.1 (Part 2) (1977) (emphasis added); see also, Quincy Wright,
The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 56 (1947) (a crime under
international law is “an act committed with intent to violate a fundamental interest
protected by international law or with knowledge that the act will probably violate such
an interest, and which may not be adequately punished by the exercise of the normal
criminal jurisdiction of any state”). These definitions suggest that the interests protected
go beyond those of direct concern to other states’ interests, but they are ambiguous as to
which interests of the human being will be “safeguarded”—the example of apartheid
suggests it is not limited to physical integrity. So, for example, such language does not
resolve the question of whether widespread censorship of press and speech, or outlawing
of certain religions, would constitute state crime.
Sometimes the over-expansive language of human rights is invoked to give
substantive content to state crime, possibly for lack of a consensus on which subset of
human rights are protected under international criminal law. See, e.g., Leon Hurwitz,
International State-Sponsored Organizations to Control State Crime: The European
Convention on Human Rights, in CONTROLLING STATE CRIME 284 (Jeffrey Ian Ross ed.,
Transactions Pub. 2000) (taking the view that “violations of human rights are most
assuredly ‘crimes’ and . . . physical violence is not a requirement to be classified as
such”); David Kauzlarich, Ronald Kramer, & Brian Smith, Toward the Study of
Governmental Crime: Nuclear Weapons, Foreign Intervention, and International Law,
16 HUMANITY & SOC. 543, 557 (1992) (moving freely between violations of human rights
and state crime).
Prosper Weil argues that uncertainty about which international norms should be
accorded the status of state crimes severely undermines the international law regime.
Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 424-28
(1983).
97. See Ira Sharkansky, A State Action May Be Nasty But It Is Not Likely to Be a
Crime, in CONTROLLING STATE CRIME, supra note 96 at 36 (“[A]cademic practitioners in
the field of state crime have gone to such extremes in their usage as to deprive the term of
any significance.”); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute
Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2591 (1991) (“A
variety of post-Nuremberg efforts to enlarge the scope of crimes against humanity have
brought more confusion than clarity to the term’s meaning.”). Penny Green and Tony
Ward make a related point in preferring a “torture paradigm” of state crime over a “health
paradigm.” State Crime, Human Rights and the Limits of Criminology, 27 SOC. JUSTICE
101, 103-04 (2000). They observe “sociological continuity” between crimes like torture
and violations of positive human rights such as deprivation of basic human necessities,
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resolve at this stage, however, the additional specifying criteria in the
context of state crime in order to understand that the legitimacy question
is fundamental to assessing state action.  (I will shortly propose one
additional criterion infra in Part B.)  Because legitimacy is at issue, and
that legitimacy turns on apparent reasons accessible to the public,
objective, not subjective, intent is morally relevant to any inquiry into
state action, including the question of state crime.
B. What is Objective State Intent?
It should be evident that the present argument for the use of
objective intent is not simply a pragmatic response to the evidentiary
burdens a prosecutor or claimant under the CAT would face if required
to show subjective intent on the part of a collective agent such as a state.
Nor does my argument that objective intent, rather than subjective intent,
should constitute the mental state requirement for a state crime depend
on the proposition that there is no such thing as subjective intent as
applied to a collective agent.98  In construing subjective intent for an
individual criminal defendant, courts make presumptions about the
existence of a unitary and continuous moral agent capable of forming
stable and coherent intentions.99  Derek Parfit has described the problems
with most common conceptions of personal identity, and has argued that
our identity consists in a collection of physical and psychological facts,
and in fact, is not always determinate.100  We persist in putting aside this
problem of identity for most normative purposes, however, and we
assign blame and punish persons for past deeds, including deeds
undertaken by conflicted persons who might have acted otherwise
moments later.101  We do so not just because we are conceptually
comfortable with the idea of the unitary person, but because a conception
of the person which did not allow for assumptions of continuity would
render us unfamiliar to ourselves and drain our lives of meaning and
but conclude that it is not helpful to “stretch the term ‘crime’ to cover all social harms.”
Id.
98. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479, 1507 (1987) (describing realists’ rejection of the “anthropomorphism of
legislative ‘intent’”).
99. See MOORE, supra note 74, at 616 (describing the criminal law’s presumption of
“unified character structure,” i.e., an intelligible pattern to individual mental states and
actions, both at any time and over time, as well as a “unified consciousness.”).
100. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 201-17 (Oxford Univ. Press 1984).
101. It is an interesting question, but one beyond the scope of this article, whether we
are more lenient with a defendant who has evinced inconsistent and unstable criminal
purpose prior to his criminal act because we deem the act less culpable, or instead
because we are reluctant to reduce him to the person who in a given moment committed
the criminal act.
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purpose.  Similarly normatively motivated presumptions make it possible
to construct a notion of subjective state intent.  For example, one might
take state intent to consist of the intentions stated in legislation,
statements made by the executive in internal documents assessing a
course of action, statements contained in committee reports, statements
made publicly in support of a course of action, etc.102  Each of these
constructions of state intent are viable and plausibly motivated under
various circumstances.  My argument for the use of objective state intent
in the context of assessing responsibility for state conduct is normative,
not metaphysical.103
Inasmuch as objective intent turns on apparent reasons, the
objective intent of a state turns on the social meaning citizens of that
state will assign to the state’s action.104  Obviously, social meaning is
illusive, or at least, indeterminate.  There are a number of conceptual
tests we could use, the appeal of which should be judged in terms of how
well they capture the effect of state action on political authority.  For
example, one might ask what reasons a reasonable observer would
attribute to the state; alternatively, one might ask which of the most
generous rationales for state action the groups directly disadvantaged
would find plausible.  These possible tests are objective, but context-
specific.  That is, while they do not amount to a poll, actual attitudes
toward state action are strong evidence of its legitimacy or lack thereof.
This might appear to be a drawback of this conception of state crime
since, historically, many oppressive and quasi-criminal regimes have
enjoyed substantial support among their populations.105  However,
general support for a government does not necessarily imply that the
populations affirmatively supported the quasi-criminal activities of those
states.  Those state activities which are widely acknowledged and
102. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1523-24 (2000) (discussing how one
might construct legislative intent in order to identify the expressive impact of legislative
action).
103. See Hans Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law
with Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 CAL. L. REV. 530, 533
(1942-43) (“[I]f it is possible to impute physical acts performed by individuals to the
State although the State has no body, it must be possible to impute psychic acts to the
State although the State has no soul. Imputation to the State is a juristic construction, not
a description of natural reality.”).
104. I have argued this elsewhere. See Deliberative Autonomy and Legitimate State
Purpose Under the First Amendment, 68 ALB. L. REV. 815, 834 (2005).
105. Cf. GREEN & WARD, supra note 79, at 109 (“[T]he fact that citizens believe in
the legitimacy of their government is not equal to the fact that a given power relationship
is legitimate . . . illegitimacy is an objective property of the relevant act in the sense that
it does not depend upon how the act is perceived by its social audience.”).
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supported are indeed more difficult to characterize as quasi-criminal on
my view.
The significance of a regime’s support among its governed
population raises two fundamental questions with respect to the degree of
contextuality for which objective state intent should allow.  First, is the
reasonable observer by whose perspective we might decipher objective
intent situated within the relevant country?  Second, is the observer
assessing the state’s actions at the time that they occur, or with the
benefit of hindsight?  The reasonable observer should be situated within
the relevant country, but should enjoy the benefit of hindsight.
1. Contextualized Reasonableness
Objective state intent should hinge on social context.  That is, the
reasons reasonably attributed to the state will depend on the social,
political, and economic history of the country, as well as existing
circumstances, salient controversies, and known government priorities
and objectives.  Like language informs the meaning of text, social
context will inform the objective intent of the state.  As our use of the
concept of objective state intent is normatively motivated, the underlying
issue is whether it is the perspective of the governed or some other,
outside perspective that speaks to legitimacy.  I have argued that
legitimacy turns not directly on whether a state fulfills certain functions
but rather on whether individuals may rationally defer or respect law
promulgated by the state on the grounds that it fulfills some critical
function.  Whether that attitude is possible is best assessed from the
perspective of those whose attitudes toward the state and its laws are at
issue.106
Conceiving of state intent in this contextualized manner may in
some instances result in a more lenient standard than one which would
employ the perspective of an outsider.  But at other times, this approach
will result in a more robust standard of state responsibility.  Actions that
might appear benign, innocuous or even accidental from the outside may
be plausibly interpreted as planned, insidious, or malicious from within
106. See FRIEDRICH, supra note 93, at 226 (“Since opinions, values and beliefs, as
well as interests and needs, are continually changing in response to changes in the
environment and to creative innovation, whether of a political, aesthetic, technical or
religious nature, it is quite possible, indeed it is a recurrent experience, that a person may
lose his power based on authority not because the commands he gives or the opinions he
utters are less ‘authoritative’ in the sense that they may not be elaborated by reasoning,
but because such reasoning is related to opinions, values and beliefs that have lost their
validity in that community. It is therefore necessary to sharpen further the definition of
authority as the capacity for reasoned elaboration by adding: in terms of the opinions,
values and beliefs, interests and needs of the community within which the authority
operates.”).
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the society governed.  Within the admittedly nebulous bound of
reasonableness, the latter perspective should be honored.  Just as a
speaker may be presumed fluent in the language she speaks, so will a
government be presumed well-versed in the social context in which it
operates. While that presumption may not hold, a failure on the part of a
state to understand the implications of its own actions can never operate
as an excuse.  A state may be mistaken about the legitimacy of its
actions, but as we are interested in legitimacy itself and not, for example,
state sincerity, it is the conditions of legitimacy that appropriately inform
the intent inquiry in the context of state crime.  Again, legitimacy turns
on the perspective of the governed.  A state whose actions are likely to
be interpreted especially ungenerously by its citizens is likely to be at
least in part responsible for the prevailing distrust, and thus it should not
be surprising that this background distrust will adversely impact an
assessment of the legitimacy of its actions.
One might worry that interpreting a state’s intention in light of the
social meaning of a state’s action, especially in the highly contextualized
manner advocated here, collapses the distinction between state and
society. While the special character—and in particular, the unique moral
function—of a state is the grounds for looking to objective rather than
subjective intent, whenever we look in the law to objective intent, it must
be interpreted within the social context in which the agent acts.  For
example, we will understand the objective intent of the parties to a
contract with reference to the common structure of similar contracts, the
norms of the industry in which the contract is located, and more general
social facts that inform the meaning of the language used in the
contract.107 Similarly, we will understand the objective intentions of a
director on a corporate board only by appreciating typical corporate
behavior. Thus, the argument for the use of objective intent in the
context of state crimes is not an argument for a type of intent wholly
unfamiliar to the law, and it should raise no special concerns about the
conflation of the legal actor with the society in which she acts.
Contextualized objective intent is the dominant notion of intent in the
law.108  It is the narrow, special case of individual criminal law where
subjective intent does and should play an important role.
107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 221-222 (1979).
108. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (whether a police
officer has qualified immunity depends on the “objective” question of whether a
reasonable officer would believe there was probable cause—officer’s subjective beliefs
are “irrelevant”); Yount v. Acuff Rose-Opryland, 103 F.3d 830, 836 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“Contract interpretation is governed by the objective intent of the parties as embodied in
the words of the contract.”); Flax v. Smith, 479 N.E.2d 183, 185 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985)
(holding that whether an implied easement has arisen turns not on the grantor’s subjective
intent but on the presumed objective intent of grantor and grantee under the
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2. Reasonableness with Hindsight
The second dimension of objective state intent requires a choice of
temporal context: society at the time of the alleged crime, or society at
the time of adjudication.  In many cases, support for a regime, and
perhaps even its quasi-criminal activities, ultimately gives way to
loathing and distrust.  Indeed, because only a major change in social
conditions or political balance makes inquiry into state crime
conceivable or feasible, inquiries into state crime are especially likely to
take place after substantial time has passed.109  The question of timing,
i.e., the moment in time from which a reasonable observer should
evaluate state action, is therefore critical.  Here is another point at which
the legal concept of state crime should diverge from that of domestic
individual crime.  Because the concern is with legitimacy, the inquiry
may impose the perspective of hindsight and consider information that
may not have been in the public domain at the time the actions were
taken.  After all, the question is whether the actions were legitimate, and
that question of act-specific legitimacy is conceptualized with reference
to the legitimacy of political authority.  The question is not whether the
actions in fact undermined political legitimacy, let alone whether it was
perceived to have that effect at the time.
The hypothetical nature of the inquiry implies that whether a state
action was quasi-criminal will depend on how a reasonable observer
would assess that action today.  While punishment of an individual based
on shifting standards would violate basic precepts of criminal law and
theory, state crime does not raise the same issues.110  The
blameworthiness and desert of an individual defendant turn on what was
known to the defendant at the time.  In particular, the character of the
subjective intent that is at issue in individual criminal law will turn on
circumstances); Alton M. Johnson Co. v. M.A.I. Co., 463 N.W.2d 277, 279 (Minn. 1990)
(whether a settlement is reasonable in an insurance coverage dispute depends on
objective facts facing plaintiff); Noll v. Harrisburg YMCA, 643 A.2d 81, 87-88 (Pa.
1994) (holding that whether a product is an improvement to real property turns on the
objective intent of the parties); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) (setting
forth an objective conception of negligence under the “reasonable man” standard).
109. See Stanley Cohen, State Crime of Previous Regimes: Knowledge,
Accountability, and the Policing of the Past, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 7, 45-46 (1995)
(describing the problems associated with the “profound discontinuity” between the
society in which state crimes are reviewed, and the one in which they took place. “The
torturer from last year’s military junta does not always seem to quite belong to today’s
time.”).
110. Jeremy Waldron makes a closely related point, arguing that because the
prohibition on torture applies in the first instance to states and state policy, there is no
compelling liberty interest in defining the contours of the crime precisely in advance. See
Waldron, supra note 68, at 1699.
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the world as it is known to the defendant, which is of course limited to
the world as it in fact exists at that time.  But we are interested in
objective intent on the part of the state because it is the appearance of the
state’s reasons for actions that affect legitimacy.  We are, moreover,
interested in the legitimacy of the state as an ongoing enterprise.111  The
aim is rarely punishment per se, given not just the absence of institutions
capable of effecting punishment but the practical difficulty in punishing a
state without punishing the society and people it governs, among whom
are the victims of many kinds of state crime, like torture.  Thus, the
remedy of state crime usually takes the form of some kind of rejection.
Whether that rejection is an overhaul of political institutions, a purging
of elites and state agents at various levels in varying capacities, remedial
compensation to victims, wholesale legal reform that undoes to the
extent possible ongoing effects of the earlier regime, or mere
acknowledgment of the gross wrongdoings we here refer to as state
crime, naming and rejecting is a forward-oriented project intended to
shore up the legitimacy of the state going forward.  As an objective test,
it is adaptable to the history in which it is applied, but it need not pervert
itself by assuming the very mindset that gave rise to crime, or the factual
ignorance that sustained it.
There may be no single, intuitively appealing way to implement an
objective standard for state intent.  But as we know, subjective mens rea
has given rise to its own share of moral dilemmas and dissatisfactions.
No doubt, the approach proposed here also leaves unresolved a number
of further questions that one would need to resolve in order to fully
operationalize any conception of state intent.  One might choose clarity
at the cost of flexibility and, perhaps, moral precision, and indeed, should
a juridical body ever regularly apply the concept it might eventually do
just that.  But at this early stage in the jurisprudence of state crime, it
may be better to set forth a legal principle that embodies the underlying
normative and conceptual difficulties associated with state crime.
Even if one is comfortable with the conception of objective state
intent presented here, one might question whether objective intent is
properly referred to as intent at all.  While the term is admittedly
oxymoronic, it is useful to speak of objective intent as a variant of intent.
Both the concepts of subjective and objective intent reinforce the
principle of agency in the law.  Intent requirements are essential to the
111. See Cohen, supra note 109, at 15 (“[T]here are no historical cases of total regime
change—a complete displacement of every agent of power and influence.”). Even where
new individuals are running the state, there are usually numerous legal and institutional
remnants of the prior regime. The more severe the state crimes committed, the more
drastic the wiping out of such residue—until the rejection of the prior regime approaches
something of a death penalty.
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manner in which the law regards the persons and entities it purports to
govern.
Where the law requires subjective intent for legal liability, as in
criminal law, the law honors free will by acknowledging its outer
boundaries.  In order to respect free will, the law must distinguish
between free and unfree acts.112  By denying culpability, or at least,
criminal responsibility, for acts that do not represent the exercise of free
choice, the law makes clear our moral and legal responsibility for other
actions.113  Like the requirement of subjective intent, legal inquiries that
focus on objective intent are also important in establishing the
presumption of agency in the law.  But where the law inquires only about
objective intent, the law claims for agency the still wider territory of
action intelligible by reference to objective intent.
The capacity for intent distinguishes an actor from an object or
other causal intermediary.114  Even when intention is spoken of broadly,
as in general intent, to encompass facts which should have been known
because they were foreseeable but of which the actor was not in fact
cognizant or on which she did not reflect, the characterization of the
actor’s intent emphasizes the expectation, indeed, the assumption, that
the actor acts on reasons.  Intent affirms the actor’s agency by rejecting
at once both the propositions that her actions are determined and that her
actions are random.  While the requirement of subjective intent in
criminal law and certain other limited areas incorporates the presumption
that individuals subject to law act, the apparently weaker requirement of
objective intent in much of the law presumes further that actors act on
reasons and that those reasons are intelligible to others.  Even where it
appears a defendant’s conduct was not rationally motivated, by inquiring
only after objective intent, the law presumes that she acted on reasons
112. See Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475, 494 (1968)
(arguing for a right to punishment “linked to a feature of human beings, which—were
that feature absent—the capacity to reason and to choose on the basis of reasons—
profound conceptual changes would be involved in the thought about human beings. It is
right, then, connected with a feature of men that sets them apart from other natural
phenomena.”).
113. Cf. MOORE, supra note 74, at 610-13. Moore identifies a number of assumptions
regarding the person as the object of criminal law, including rationality and autonomy.
The latter is understood to include the capacity to initiate action, to cause further events
to occur in world beyond movements of body, to act motivated by reasons, and to choose
and to cause the realization of one’s choice, or the “power to mould one’s character by
one’s own design.” Id.
114. See id. at 490 (“When we talk of not treating a human being as a person or
‘showing no respect for one as a person’ what we imply by ours words is a contrast
between the manner in which one acceptably responds to human beings and the manner
in which one acceptably responds to animals and inanimate objects. . . . [W]hen we ‘look
upon’ a person as less than a person or not a person, we consider the person as incapable
of rational choice.”).
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and that those reasons are communicable to, or at least cognizable by,
other people.115  The presumption is appropriate irrespective of the
degree of reflection actually exercised by a given actor because it is
always normatively, not just, if at all, metaphysically, motivated.  In
criminal law we presume that individuals act, rather than simply move,
because action is essential to a finding of moral culpability.  We may
sometimes further presume that the reasons on which actors act are
communicable and cognizable because the presumption underpins a
deeply intuitive regime of outcome responsibility,116 because it promotes
welfare by incentivizing optimal behavior with regard to others, or, as in
the case of state liability, because it is essential to the legitimacy of the
defendant’s authority.
Thus, to understand state intent to mean something different from
both the use of the concept of intention in domestic criminal law and
perhaps ordinary usage of the notion of intent, does not drain the concept
of moral force.  Instead, understanding state intention as an objective
construction ensures that adjudicators of state responsibility attend to the
kinds of reasons that are of moral import in the context of political
authority.  Because intention requirements in the law are varied, but
always motivated by a conception of the legal actors whose actions are
being regulated, the content of the requirement in each context
appropriately turns on our conception of the legal actor.  It is not a
surprise, then, that the relevant intention requirement for an individual is
different from that for a corporation, or a state.  In the case of a state, we
are interested not in free will but political legitimacy.  The conditions for
legitimacy are determined, at least in part, by the apparent, objective
reasons, behind state action.
III. WHAT REASONS MAKE TORTURE A STATE CRIME? OR, THE
PROBLEM WITH TORTURE
In the liberal view of state responsibility sketched above, two kinds
of background “but-for” reasons elevate torture traceable to a state policy
to the level of state crime: ruthlessness and cruelty.  Ruthlessness refers
to a demonstrated refusal to acknowledge limits on state power.  Cruelty
refers to a rejection of torture victims’ humanity and inviolability by
treating the victim as a body rather than a moral agent.  Many torture
victims represent a social or political group in the eyes of the state and
115. Cf. KENT GREENAWALT, OBJECTIVITY IN THE LAW 94 (1992) (“Confidence that
human beings are capable of discovering the mental states of others depends substantially
on confidence about the intersubjectivity of language.”).
116. See Tony Honore, Responsibility and Luck, 104 L.Q.R. 530 (1988); THOMAS
NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 24-38 (1991).
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society, such that the offense is not just to the individual torture victim.117
Torture has the intended effect of denying the humanity of the entire
group.
In its willingness to engage in torture, a state simultaneously rejects
two constraints: legal constraint and moral constraint.  Its ruthlessness
denies any legal boundary on its power, and its cruelty denies the
humanity of its victims, which would otherwise give rise to moral
restraint.  As Harold Koh has explained, “The reality of torture is the
banality of torture—captors torture and act cruelly toward other human
beings because they can: because they have the power to do so, and the
freedom to do so.”118  David Sussman has further explained, “The
torturer confronts no moral or legal impediments stemming from his
victim’s will, but is limited only by his own desires and interests, or the
desires and interests of those he serves as an agent. . . . Torture, even the
‘lite’ variety, strives to immerse its victim in a world of absolute
arbitrariness and unpredictability.”119  Both ruthlessness and cruelty raise
special concerns for liberalism, which is committed to a bounded state,
and more specifically, to boundaries which reflect the humanity of those
governed.
A. Ruthlessness
A government that allows its agents to commit torture fails to
recognize boundaries on its power.120  Numerous authors have observed
the connection between torture and tyranny.  David Luban has described
torture as “a microcosm, raised to the highest level of intensity, of the
tyrannical political relationship that liberalism hates most.”121  Already
Michel Foucault associated torture with the public spectacle of royal
dominance and revenge.122  Similarly, Jeremy Waldron argues that a rule
against torture is emblematic of a deeper legal principle:
117. See Jaime Malamud-Goti, Trying Violators of Human Rights: The Dilemma of
Transitional Democratic Governments, in STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON 71, 83
(1988).
118. Harold Koh, Can the President be Torturer in Chief?, 81 IND. L. J. 1145, 1165
(2006).
119. David Sussman, Defining Torture, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 225, 228 (2006).
120. This discussion emphasizes torture that is permitted, albeit rarely, as a matter of
policy. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has ruled that no plan or policy is required as
an element of the definition of crimes against humanity. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et al.,
Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgement, at para 98 (June 12, 2002). But this is
aberrant.
121. David Luban, Liberalism, Torture and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425,
1430 (2005).
122. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 48-49 (Alan Sheridan trans.,
Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
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Law is not brutal in its operation.  Law is not savage.  Law does not
rule through abject fear and terror, or by breaking the will of those
whom it confronts.  If law is forceful or coercive, it gets its way by
nonbrutal methods which respect rather than mutilate the dignity and
agency of those who are its subjects.123
Thus, he too concludes that “[t]orture is characteristic of tyranny, not
free government.”124
Winston Nagan and Lucie Atkins have explored more specifically
the mechanisms by which torture entrenches tyranny.  Torture, they
explain, “[a]ttacks the authority and legitimacy of the state, provokes or
intensifies social conflict, undermines the idea of peace, and, in its tacit
claim to unlimited social control, challenges the idea of the rule of law
itself.”125  In language suggestive of the conversion of the state from a
moral agent on behalf of its citizens into an exogenous and illegitimate
third party force, they argue that:
[w]hen torture becomes routine practice in governance, the state does
not represent the moral order of the community, but instead is the
repository of authorized violence and impermissible coercion. . . .
[W]hen power is maintained by practices of torture and ill treatment,
the claim to state legitimacy is illusory, or weakened.126
Nagan and Atkins point out that while torture may consist in the
“infliction of extreme pain and suffering by a victimizer who dominates
and controls,” only when it includes state sanction and/or participation,
such that it “sends a social message of intimidation and a message about
the scope, character, and strategies of official social control” does it
qualify as a crime against humanity.127  Torture as tyranny is not just a
peculiar and marginal dimension of torture but the essence of its quasi-
criminal character when committed by states.
The tyrannical character of torture is present whatever the
immediate purpose for which it is employed.  Daniel Rothberg has
explained how the public display of brutalized bodies communicates a
political message regarding the authoritarian powers of the state.  In his
case study, the difference between brutalization of dead bodies and
torture of live bodies is unimportant in that both are intended to, and do,
deny any boundaries beyond which the state cannot or will not go.  Both
123. Waldron, supra note 68, at 1726.
124. Id. at 1720.
125. Winston Nagan & Lucie Atkins, The International Law of Torture: From
Universal Proscription to Effective Application and Enforcement, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
87, 90 (2001).
126. Id. at 91.
127. Id. at 93.
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also express contempt for the individuals and groups who are
brutalized.128  Through horrific displays of its brutality, the Guatemalan
state “established a culture of fear and intimidation characterized by
enormous mistrust and heightened by the near-complete impunity that
shielded perpetrators at all levels from any possible accountability.”129
Unraveling the meaning behind their methods, he concludes that torture
is a symbol of, and a step toward, the illegitimacy of state power.130
Torture is also tyrannical when it is available as a means of law
enforcement, as in interrogational torture.  When it is among the
repertoire of the police, even if officially reserved for emergencies, it
reserves pockets of lawlessness within the law itself.  While it is surely
better to torture with the aim of avoiding the loss of human life than to
torture for any other purpose, if the law ex ante allows for torture, it fails
to recognize absolute, or at least ever present, limitations on state
power.131  The availability of torture as a method of governance means
that the state may, at its own choosing, expand its power to overwhelm
the constraints under which it is otherwise placed.  In the face of such
explosive power, individual lives are no longer sacred, just small.
Lawrence Weschler makes a related point in connection with the
solidarity movement in Poland.  He observes that his Polish informants
reported that their movement was an expression of their subjectivity, in
opposition to their experience under a tyrannical government as mere
objects of history.132  A liberal state is a medium for the political agency
of its constituents, and its mandate respects and supports their
aspirations.  At the opposite end of the spectrum, a repressive regime
uses individuals and their bodies freely for the state’s independent
purposes.  In a perversion of agency, those state purposes are self-
justifying and are not tempered or constrained by procedures and laws
intended to tie them back to the interests and rights of those governed.
Only in ruthless pursuit of unbridled state purpose does a state employ
torture.
128. Daniel Rothberg, What We Have Seen Has Been Terrible: Public Presentation
Torture and the Communicative Logic of State Terror, 67 ALB. L. REV. 465, 476 (2003).
129. Id. at 483.
130. Id. at 488-89.
131. See Seth Kreimer, Rejecting “Uncontrolled Authority Over the Body”: The
Decencies of Civilized Conduct, the Past and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 423, 446 (2007) (“Ordered liberty requires . . . that government officials
be denied unchecked discretion to impose extrajudicial violence, physical brutality, and
degradation.”); see also Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack, supra note 68, at 291 (arguing
that interrogational as well as punitive torture is unconstitutional in the United States
because both “shock the conscience”).
132. Lawrence Weschler, Afterword, in STATE CRIMES, supra note 117; see also,
GREEN & WARD, supra note 79, at 131 (torture spreads “fear and political paralysis”).
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B. Cruelty
Torture rejects not only legal constraint, but moral constraint.
Specifically, the torturer rejects her victim’s humanity and inviolability,
the very foundations of liberal boundaries on state power.133  Rejecting
the autonomy of the victim, torture instead exploits her physicality.  It
violates her bodily integrity in order to negate the personality that
depends on it.  Such “government occupation of the self” is at odds with
the vision of humanity that lies at the core of liberal democracy.134  It is
for this and related reasons, that Judith Shklar identified cruelty as the
first and worst vice in the liberal view.135  If liberalism begins, a la John
Rawls, with the individual’s two moral powers, or if liberalism begins, a
la Kant, with the individual’s capacity for reason and resulting moral
agency, the torturing state begins and ends with the individual as a body.
This is consistent with the tendency of states which systematically
degrade some subset of their citizens to emphasize the physicality of
targeted groups, and to deny those aspects of the group associated with
their humanity, such as their art, music, literature and other dimensions
of culture.  Sociologist Elizabeth Stanley observes that “victims of state
crime do not tend to be seen as ‘victims;’” instead “they are either
depicted in danger-linked ways (e.g. as subversives) or as being outside
the human experience altogether (e.g. as vermin).  Through such
devaluations, ‘victims are put out of sight or below the threshold of
moral vision;’ their perceived dangerousness and difference make them
appear ‘deserving’ of state force.”136
133. See Thomas Nagel, Personal Rights and Public Space, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83,
89-90 (1995) (inviolability means that one “may not be violated in certain ways—such
treatment is inadmissible, and if it occurs, the person has been wronged”). Nagel
illustrates the non-instrumental character of the rights that comprise inviolability in his
discussion of torture: “To be tortured would be terrible; but to be tortured and also to be
someone it was not wrong to torture would be even worse.” Id. at 93; see also Anne-
Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional Moment, 43
HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 16 (2002) (arguing that international law now recognizes a principle
of civilian inviolability, which is “a corollary of individual dignity”).
134. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack, supra note 68, at 299.
135. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 7-8 (1984).
136. Elizabeth Stanley, Truth Commissions and the Recognition of State Crime, 45
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 582, 585 (2005). See also GREEN & WARD, supra note 79, at 129,
138 (identifying circumstances where “[t]here has been a historical devaluation of a
section of the population” as among the structural conditions under which torture is more
likely and noting that victims “tend to come from the marginalised, criminalised and
impoverished sections of society”); Eric Stover & Elena O. Nightingale, M.D.,
Introduction: The Breaking of Bodies and Minds, in THE BREAKING OF BODIES AND
MINDS: TORTURE, PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE AND THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS 1, 5 (Eric Stover
and Elena O. Nightingale eds., 1985) (“[T]he purpose of torture is to break the will of the
victim and ultimately to destroy his or her humanity.”).
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Amoral treatment of the person is especially inimical to the liberal
state, which is motivated by a particular moral vision of the person.  But
every illiberal state embraces some moral conception of the person;
indeed, it is the eagerness with which some illiberal states pursue the
perfection of that ideal that renders them illiberal.  Contrary to liberal
principles, many states explicitly or implicitly fail to recognize the equal
moral worth of all persons.  But only a few outlier regimes in history
have categorically denied the worth of some group of citizens.  The
discursive conditions for disparate treatment and mistreatment of all
kinds are more modest; they invoke social hierarchies but do not usually
deny a group some place, however undesirable, in the community.
Torture goes further than most states, liberal or illiberal, are prepared to
go in their ordinary stance toward even the most downtrodden in a given
political community.  Conversely, in those rare instances where a state
does officially deny the humanity of some group, torture and other
outrages become commonplace.
Elaine Scarry has explained how torture destroys its victims in
multiple ways.  It reduces them to their body, and in the process
eliminates all those aspects of themselves which previously made up
their identity.  It reduces all the familiar objects of civilization around
them to weapons of pain, and thereby alienates the individual from the
world as she knew it.  It uses the victim’s own body against her, and
strips her of voice.137  Torture expresses the torturer’s view of the victim
to the victim, and at the same time reconstructs the victim’s view of
herself.  Its very aim is to dehumanize.138  Its object is not just the
individual torture victim but all those in the group who might have been
tortured instead.  By destroying the body, it destroys the attached subject,
others in the group to which that subject belongs, and ultimately, the
political community in which it is now possible to substitute body for
subject.139
Louis Seidman argues that “[i]n the most direct and literal sense,
torture teaches us as individuals that we are slaves to our bodies and that
our beliefs, our values, and our moral obligations—in short, all that
makes us human—count for nothing when our bodies are at stake.”140
While Siedman views this as a truth, it is not the conception of the
137. ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE
WORLD 40-41, 47-50 (1985).
138. See Patrick Lee, Interrogational Torture, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 131, 136 (2006) (aim
of torture is to disintegrate, where integration of various aspects of self is a basic human
good).
139. See generally Franz Kaltenbeck, On Torture and State Crime, 24 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2381, 2391 (2003) (“Torture destroys not only the body but also the subject. Not
only the subject of the victim!”).
140. Louis Michael Seidman, Torture’s Truth, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 881, 886 (2005).
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person that motivates and constrains the state.  The liberal conception of
the person emphasizes our capacity to reason for the sake of our own
projects and in order to respect others; like other political philosophies, it
must take into account the body but cannot be reduced to it.  To reduce
the citizen to her body destroys much of what motivates the moral edifice
that guards it.  John Parry elaborates the parallel effect of torture on the
legal world it inhabits:
[T]orture mocks the law, using punishment to gather evidence to
justify the punishment already inflicted, rather than using evidence
already gathered to justify punishment.  When torture is legal in the
sense of being an official policy, the victims’ suffering and pain
become irrelevant to the law and they become further isolated at the
moment they are most in need of the law’s protections.141
The torturing state need not be indifferent to suffering in general.
Nor is it always sadistic, imposing suffering for its own sake; torture is
most likely to occur in the quest for information in the context of
security.  But the cruelty in torture is a departure from the premise of
humanity that should undergird all state policy and practice.  Torture is
only possible where the state has suspended that commitment to the
humanity of its victim.  As a practice it embodies indifference, which is
just the absence of that commitment, and as a policy it communicates
that indifference, which only emboldens further cruelty.
Thus, torture is the product of illegitimacy, is itself illegitimate, and
breeds illegitimacy.  It is the symptom of a state that cannot govern
effectively and fulfill its moral function within the bounds of law.  It is
possible only where some group is dehumanized and excluded from the
political community.  It is illegitimate in its absolute and radical exercise
of power and indifference to suffering and brutality.  It breeds
illegitimacy because it creates new and morally defective reasons to obey
the state, and further alienates and segregates the group from which
torture victims are drawn.  Drawing on my earlier conclusions regarding
the nature of criminal state intent, when we ask whether a state has
committed the particular crime of torture, we should ask the following
regarding the state’s intent: Would a reasonable observer view the
challenged policy or practice as ruthless in its indifference to legal
constraint, and cruel in its disregard for the humanity of its victims?
141. John T. Parry, What is Torture, Are We Doing it, and What if We Are?, 64 U.
PITT. L. REV. 237, 247-48 (2003).
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IV. BEYOND THE SPECIFIC/GENERAL INTENT DISTINCTION:
TRANSPARENCY
I have argued above that the fundamental moral question for a state,
as distinct from a private individual, is the legitimacy of the political
authority it claims.  I further argued that the legitimacy of its authority
turns on the apparent reasons behind its actions and policies.  Finally, I
have argued that with respect to the crime of torture, it is the ruthlessness
and cruelty communicated by torture which undermine the legitimacy of
any state that engages in the practice of torture.  In the previous Part, my
aim was to show that the inquiry into state intent should be an objective
one, and more specifically, that an adjudicator of state responsibility for
torture should assess whether the policy or practice in question
communicates the ruthlessness and cruelty endemic to torture, and which
makes it repugnant to a liberal state.
These arguments also have implications for what should not be a
part of the inquiry.  Because the morally relevant conception of intent in
the context of state crime is an objective one, it is not of fundamental
importance whether the central actors in the scheme of torture intended
to accomplish the act of torture.  It is not important, in other words,
whether we would characterize their intentions as “specific” in the
meaning of domestic criminal law.
But it would not be accurate, either, to say that the inquiry should be
into general intent.  It may very well be the case that the public will
reasonably attribute to the government the intention to accomplish all
predictable consequences of state action.  But this is not necessarily the
case.  Robust public discourse regarding public affairs will allow for a
fairly nuanced understanding of the complex motives behind state policy.
It is not always the case that the specificity of the state’s purpose will
relate systematically to its illegitimacy.
More important than specificity in this context, is transparency.  The
importance of transparency was already implicitly acknowledged by the
Tate Letter, which shifted U.S. foreign immunity doctrine such that only
public acts of foreign governments would be protected.142  More
generally, it is evident that secrecy rather than specificity of intent poses
the greater threat.  Intent to hide or mislead the public regarding a
practice of torture communicates with particular intensity the contempt
for law and moral constraint which makes torture problematic in the first
place.  Secrecy makes it impossible for law to govern the torturing state,
142. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dept. of State, to Acting Att.
General Philip Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T OF STATE BULL. 969, 984-
85 (1952).
2009] INTENTION, TORTURE AND THE CONCEPT OF STATE CRIME 43
and thereby makes the ruthless practice still more ruthless.143  Secrecy
also denies the obligation to justify the exercise of power on individuals,
it denies the legitimate interest of the political community in what
happens to the torture victim, and in this cruelty it alienates and
dehumanizes her.
Torture that betrays ruthlessness and cruelty on the part of the state
may stoke illegitimacy well enough on its own to qualify as quasi-
criminal.  But inasmuch as we face the challenge of delimiting ‘state
crime’ to as narrow a sphere of state activity as possible, it may behoove
us to add additional limiting principles, in the same way that we rely on
more than blameworthiness to identify domestic individual crimes.  If it
seems too “lenient” to demarcate only secret torture as criminal, it is not.
First, it is indeed the case that the states which we would characterize as
most illegitimate are the ones most likely to practice torture secretly and
with the least scrutiny possible.144  That said, it may be the case that we
have recently seen a tidal change in that it is now politically possible to
be “pro-torture” inasmuch as that is taken to communicate a commitment
to national security.145
Second, it is rarely the case that a state tortures on an ad hoc, public
basis such that it would not be subject to quasi-criminal responsibility for
its torture.  Most torture is committed illicitly, but regularly.  No state
commits torture as a matter of public policy.146  Yet torture is committed
via policies, guidelines and directives—not ad hoc emergency
measures.147  Thus, a state that engages in torture is likely to have formed
an intent both to do so and to do so under cover from public and
international scrutiny.
One might object and argue that, between secret and open torture,
secret torture is the lesser evil.  Secret torture communicates nothing, and
143. Mary Margaret Penrose, Impunity—Inertia, Inaction, and Invalidity: A
Literature Review, 17 B.U. INT’L L.J. 269, 270 (1999) (“It is essential to the structure of
torture that it take place in secret, in the dark, beyond considerations of shame and
account.”).
144. See Ruth Wedgwood, International Criminal Law and Augusto Pinochet, 40 VA.
J. INT’L L. 829, 836 (2000) (“Authoritarian regimes usually hide or deny their violent
practices, rather than protest proffered standards.”); William Chambliss, State-Organized
Crime, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 183, 204 (1989) (“[S]tate agencies whose activities can be
hidden from scrutiny are more likely to engage in criminal acts than those whose record
is public. This principle may also apply to whole nation-states: the more open the
society, the less likely it is that state-organized crime will become institutionalized”).
145. See Jamieson et al, supra note 19, at 520 (“What is arguably novel in the
contemporary War on Terror is not that a liberal democracy would engage in the illegal
othering practices discussed above, but rather that it does so with a brash lack of concern
about admitting it.”).
146. S. Rep. No. 249, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 8 (1991).
147. Luban, supra note 121, at 1445.
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therefore cannot corrupt political culture, let alone individual attitudes
toward the state.  Alternatively, one might argue that, if we are confident
that secret torture is worse, it reveals a flaw in a legal conception of
torture that concerns itself with political attitudes.  Both arguments
confuse a legal standard that turns on the rational conditions for belief in
the legitimacy of political authority, with one that centers on actual
belief.  As explained above in Part II.B., this distinction has a number of
consequences, one of which is to evaluate state action retrospectively and
with full information.  Thus, the nature of the actions that might
constitute torture should be assessed with knowledge that the public may
not have had at the time those acts were committed.  The fact that the
state’s actions were cloaked and withheld from public scrutiny is a
separate fact, and one that should be accorded great weight in
characterizing the action as not just de-legitimizing, but also quasi-
criminal.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR WITHHOLDING CLAIMS
In this Part, I assess the implications of this view for withholding
claims under CAT, the primary context within which American courts
are called upon to assess whether other states are engaging in torture.
The official interpretation of the CAT adopted by the United States is
flawed because it imposes a specific intent requirement that is neither
objective nor concerned with publicity.  In doing so we make a double
error: we treat state crimes as essentially the same as individual crime,
and we fail to distinguish between the quasi-criminal and humanitarian
functions of the CAT. The best interpretation of CAT will ask whether
the state’s challenged practices communicate the ruthlessness and cruelty
which make torture anathema.  Because withholding proceedings under
CAT are more humanitarian than quasi-criminal, it is not necessary to
inquire further whether the challenged practices are committed openly or
in hiding.
As discussed in Part I, the Board of Immigration Appeals and
several US Courts of Appeal have imported a “specific intent”
requirement as conceived in domestic law into immigration law.  In order
to show eligibility for withholding of removal under CAT, an alien must
show that the torture to which she may be subject would be specifically
intended by governmental actors, i.e., state agents with the actual
purpose of accomplishing the criminal act of torture.
8 CFR Section 208.18(a) sets out the definition of torture which an
alien must meet to qualify for withholding.  Section 208.18(a)(5)
provides that in order to constitute torture an act must be specifically
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.  In
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Auguste v. Ridge, the Third Circuit concluded under this standard that
“[a]n act that results in unanticipated or unintended severity of pain and
suffering is not torture.”148 Auguste further elaborates:
[F]or an act to constitute torture, there must be a showing that the
actor had the intent to commit the act as well as the intent to achieve
the consequences of the act, namely the infliction of the severe pain
and suffering.  In contrast, if the actor intended the act but did not
intend the consequences of the act, i.e., the infliction of the severe
pain and suffering, although such pain and suffering may have been a
foreseeable consequence, the specific intent standard would not be
satisfied.149
The Auguste court rejected the alien’s contention that torture exists
where the actor had knowledge that the action or inaction might cause
severe pain and suffering as “inconsistent with the meaning of specific
intent.”150
A number of commentators have observed a few perverse
consequences of a specific intent rule in this context.  For example,
governments can effectively immunize themselves from CAT by passing
laws prohibiting certain unlawful practices, which will make it difficult
for an immigration court to conclude that the state intends to accomplish
those prohibited acts.151  Moreover, the specific intent standard creates an
incentive for governments “to purposefully shield themselves from
knowledge of torture in their jurisdictions, and so duck their obligations
under the treaty.”152  Under US implementing regulations, “acquiescence
of a public official requires that the public official, prior to the activity
constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter
breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such
activity.”153  But awareness, in the legal sense, of particular instances of
torture is not necessary to communicate indifference to law or moral
constraint.
Indeed, the specific intent standard fails to track any apparent
morally relevant criteria.  It leads to peculiar results.  Auguste’s claim
148. 395 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005).
149. Id. at 145-46.
150. Id. at 146.
151. See Lori A. Nessel, Willful Blindness to Gender-Based Violence Abroad: United
States’ Implementation of Article Three of the United Nations Convention Against
Torture, 89 MINN. L. REV. 71, 123-24 (2004); see also id. at 128 (noting that specific
intent is not required in the domestic civil rights statutes that are more analogous to the
remedial nature of Article 3).
152. Patricia J. Freshwater, Note, The Obligation of Non-Refoulement under the
Convention Against Torture: When has a Foreign Government Acquiesced in the Torture
of its Citizens?, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 585, 598 (2005).
153. 8 CFR Sec. 208.18(a)(7) (2008).
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was rejected because the court found there was no evidence that prison
officials intended to torture him, even if they maintained conditions that
would lead to pain and suffering of an intensity that might qualify the
causal acts as torture in some other context.154  But in Lavira v. Att’y
Gen., the same court (albeit a different panel) was more sympathetic.155
The Lavira court relied on a “caveat” in the Auguste holding:
[W]e are not adopting a per se rule that brutal and deplorable prison
conditions can never constitute torture.  To the contrary, if there is
evidence that authorities are placing an individual in such conditions
with the intent to inflict severe pain and suffering on that individual,
such an act may rise to the level of torture.156
Because Lavira was disabled, the court concluded that “[s]evere pain is
not ‘a’ possible consequence that ‘may result’ from placing Lavira in the
facility, it is the only plausible consequence given what Haitian officials
know about Lavira and about their own facility.”157  The result was not
surprising in itself, but it was surprising in light of the earlier result in
Auguste.  It was especially surprising that Lavira’s claim was not
distinguished on the possible grounds that a disabled person was likely to
suffer still more than an able-bodied person in the deplorable conditions
that prevail in Haitian prisons.  Rather, the court decided that prison
officials intended to inflict pain and suffering on the disabled person by
placing disabled persons in the same horrific conditions that all others
were placed in.
It does not seem plausible that the horrific conditions in Haitian
prisons constituted torture on the facts in Lavira but not Auguste.  The
current standard simply fails to map onto the morally relevant questions
about torture by states.  Instead, having set off on the unhelpful path
outlined by domestic criminal law, it must grope awkwardly to articulate
what is apparent: that practices and policies which are pursued with
indifference to law and the dignity of their victims constitute torture.
While claims under CAT should not turn on the distinction between
general and specific intent, they probably should not turn on secrecy
either.  That is because while the distinction between secrecy and
transparency is helpful is separating quasi-criminal from truly
unanticipated, scrutinized, and therefore rare instances of torture, the
latter distinction itself is of limited relevance in the withholding context.
That is because Article 3 of CAT is primarily a statement of
humanitarian obligation.  This means that those criteria which speak to
154. Auguste, 395 F.3d at 153-54.
155. 478 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2007).
156. Id. at 169 (quoting Auguste, 395 F.3d at 154).
157. Id. at 170.
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the quasi-criminal character of a state policy of torture should not be part
of the Article 3 inquiry.
This would represent a change from current practice as well.  In In
re J-E, the BIA seemed to believe that specific intent was absent in part
because third parties were permitted to witness the alleged torture.158
Similarly, the Auguste court was moved by the fact that the Haitian
government “freely permitted the ICRC, the Haitian Red Cross, MICAG,
and other human rights groups to enter prisons and police stations,
monitor conditions, and assist prisoners with medical care, food, and
legal aid.”159  The Auguste court abruptly rejected “Auguste’s contention
that the introduction of criminal law concepts into the standard for relief
under the Convention was in error because the Convention is not about
criminal prosecution, but rather about protecting the victims of torture”
as “besides the point.”  It insisted that “[t]he specific intent standard is a
term of art that is well-known in American jurisprudence. . . .”160
Article 3 should be understood as primarily humanitarian for a
number of reasons.  First, the first consequence of a finding of eligibility
for removal is that the plaintiff alien is permitted to remain in the United
States.  There is simply no defendant in these cases, and it is peculiar to
view the alien’s attempt to avoid misery as but a means by which to
adjudicate state guilt.  In fact, the CAT as a whole, with its primary
apparent purpose of aiding victims of torture, rather than punishing its
perpetrators, more closely resembles a tort statute than a criminal statute.
Denying that criminal standards should be imported into Article 3
hearings does not eliminate the possibility of “naming” states responsible
for torture.  Limited international fora for the adjudication of state crime
exist, as does the remote possibility of a civil remedy in certain
jurisdictions, as in the United States.  But until international institutions
exist that are capable of neutrally adjudicating and enforcing state
responsibility, the international community must rely on states to name
and punish themselves.  Articles 12 and 13 of the CAT already recognize
this reality in that they call on states to investigate torture.161  In this they
will stand as judge and accused—unless they fragment power between
branches in precisely the manner that makes torture less likely in the first
place.
158. In re J-E, 23 I & N Dec. 291, 301 (2002).
159. 395 F.3d at 153 (quoting In re J-E, 23 I & N Dec. at 301).
160. Id. at 145.
161. See CAT, supra note 2.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The continuing practice of torture is astonishing and raises many
interesting and difficult questions. Many of those questions have little to
do with the mental state of the sponsoring state.  But constructing a
morally sound conception of state intention is essential to the legal
enterprise of understanding torture.  Many scholars and advocates have
grappled with the human costs and implications of torture; too few have
attempted to identify and defend the specific elements of the legal act.
I have attempted to set forth a well-conceived account of what
torture entails on the part of a state, that is, what a state must intend to
do.  Specifically, I have argued that a state should be deemed to have
intended torture where a reasonable observer, situated within the society
governed by that state but with the advantage of hindsight, would see
implicit in the state’s actions a rejection of both legal boundaries on its
powers and moral constraints on its treatment of the most marginalized
persons in its power.  Where those actions are further undertaken in
secrecy, or in a manner calculated to avoid discursive scrutiny, they may
assume a quasi-criminal character.
The project is modest in at least two respects: I do not attempt to
characterize torture in all its dimensions.  Nor do I attempt to promote a
conception of state intention that is appropriate in all contexts, even
within the law.  Just as torture has many dimensions which may be
addressed separately, the fundamental concept of intention should be
adapted to institutional context.  That said, there is set of practices that
varying elaborations of torture must illuminate.  The concept of intention
too does common conceptual and moral work in a variety of contexts.  In
particular, it makes operative the idea that agents are motivated by
reasons.  Because moral agents, at least individual and state agents, differ
fundamentally in their constitution, and because the criteria for
evaluating those reasons correspondingly differs, the operative notion of
intent must be adapted as well.
The conceptual flexibility promoted in this paper is pragmatic.  The
absence of a compelling moral account of legal torture in the existing
literature is an obstacle to legal expression of its criminality, even with
respect to states.  To be sure, grave political and institutional barriers
exist to a legal order, domestically or internationally, in which states are
legally accountable for torture.  But if the law has thus far failed to give
adequate legal expression to state responsibility for torture, we can begin
by articulating outside of law what is now lacking in it.
